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Abstract 
 
 
Recently, expectations have been raised on the civic participation role that requires supports from 
free press, decent average years in education attainment and independent juridical system in 
controlling corruption. Even so, questions have been put forward on how far this promising 
approach can go. This paper asks if these determinants are sufficient for fighting corruption 
through civic engagement. We propose that education in particular its distribution is the crucial 
tool for the majority of citizens to correctly acquire the key information and skills to succeed in 
their anti-corruption initiatives. This paper presents the simple reduced-form theoretical model 
which allows education inequality among agents before it employs the cross-national panel data 
estimations between 1990-2005 to evaluate the anti-corruption effect of education equality across 
the globe. Education equality significantly shows independent and complimentary anti-corruption 
effects through press freedom and the length of democracy. However, the anti-corruption effect 
of average years in education lost its robustness when education equality measures are included in 
fixed effects estimation. 
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1   Introduction 
 
“In the fight against corruption, citizens can no longer be seen as passive 
recipients; they are main actors and strategic partners rather than targeted 
groups. The principles of empowerment, transparency, participation and 
accountability are at the core of the civic-based anti-corruption initiative,”  
(UNDP, 2004: p.6). 
 
As one of the leading international organisations that have been actively engaged in 
numerous international anti-corruption programs, the UNDP has developed the above strategic 
vision for its anti-corruption initiatives
1
. The vision clearly values the new “civic-based” 
approach in combating corruption which has received growing supports from international anti-
corruption initiatives. In fact, Svensson (2005) argues that the classic anti-corruption programs 
that aim to reduce the size of government and regulation have received very few successes in 
practice, and limited support in empirical evidence. On the other hand, the civic-based
2
 anti-
corruption programs that aim to promote socioeconomic factors which encourage civic 
monitoring, have received great supports from both practitioners and scholars
 3
. 
For instance, Keen (2000), in association with the Human Rights Education Association 
(HREA), suggests that public education program should incorporate anti-corruption education as 
its prime purpose to reduce the likelihood of corruption in society. Public education program 
should cover the broad spectrum of activities which promote the dissemination of information 
and increase the awareness about corruption. It should also change the perception and attitudes 
towards corruption and pass on the new skills and abilities needed to counter corruption. In fact, a 
number of governments have adopted anti-corruption education in actual compulsory 
curriculum
4
. For example, Cameroon started their pilot program of “Fighting against corruption 
through schools” that teaches students and parents to identify and act against dishonesty in their 
school and the rest of the society. Hence, education can be an effective channel to indoctrinate the 
right awareness and perception towards corruption which makes the perceived benefits of 
engaging in anti-corruption activity of people more obvious. 
Despite the significant policy recommendations and large literature that support the roles 
of socioeconomic factors in promoting civic-based anti-corruption initiatives, the empirical 
evidences and theoretical foundation for the role of education are limited and no single study 
                                                 
1 OECD and UNESCO also have similar policy recommendations. 
2 Comparable to an external mechanism (outside bureaucratic system) in Brunetti and Weder (2003) 
3 For instance, Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Rikka and Svennsson (2006) 
4 See Table 4 in Appendix 3 
examine the role of equality in education. However, Magnus et al. (2002) finds that education can 
increase the tolerance of people in the society against corrupt behaviors, which can stop them 
perform corruptive activities and engage in any anti-corruption initiative. Furthermore, as 
schooling raises interpersonal and cognitive skills, an increase in schooling reduces the cost of 
engaging in anti-corruption initiative and also improves the efficiency in doing so, Glaeser et al. 
(2007). On the other hand, education can promote corruption through various channels. Since 
corruption is an illegal and secret activity, politicians and bureaucratic officers have incentives to 
make it complicated and unnoticeable. Educated officials can be more effective in making 
corruption sophisticated. When corruption becomes more complicated and very well concealed, it 
is more difficult and costly for the media and citizens to challenge the corrupt acts, Ahrend 
(2002). Moreover, an expansion of education brings about the larger potential rents that corrupted 
agents can extract, Eicher et al. (2007) and Frechette (2006). As a result, the relationship between 
education and corruption is non-monotonic which could be the underlying reason behind the 
fragile relationship between education and corruption in the literature. However, economists have 
paid very limited attention to this issue. 
 The main argument of this paper is that people in the society who are potential monitors 
of corruption, depending on their stock of human capital, have heterogeneous attitudes toward 
corruption and heterogeneous anti-corruption skills through civic participation. There are several 
studies that support this argument. For instance, Magnus et al. (2002) uses the cross-national 
evidence to show that the level of intolerance against cheating increase in the year of schooling
5
. 
Dwivedi (1967) uses the evidences from Indian Public Opinion Survey to show that the 
differences in education attainment can explain the heterogeneity in civic engagement and 
political knowledge as well as the perspective towards honesty of government officials among the 
participants
6
. Hence, the equality in human capital distribution should reduce the scale of 
undesirable heterogeneities and allow the monitoring agents to credibly create monitoring threats 
against corrupted officials. This can eventually control corruption. In other words, what matters 
for constraining corruption through civic-based anti-corruption mechanism is not only the 
absolute stock of human capital in the society but the relative stock of human capital across the 
population. Consequently, theoretical models that assume homogeneous stocks of human capital 
across agents and identification strategy that employ only the average enrollment or attainment 
rates of schooling across total population are likely to find either insignificant or inaccurate 
effects of education on corruption. 
                                                 
5 Magnus conducted the experiment with 885 students (high school, undergraduate and post graduate) from Russia, 
Israel, Netherlands and US 
6 See Table 6-7 in Appendix 3 
This paper tests the hypothesis that education has either insignificant or promoting effect 
on corruption against the alternative hypothesis that education, and in particular its equality, has 
anti-corruption effect in the society. We focus on the cross-country evidence between 1990-2005 
and identify the causal relationship between equality in education and the perceived level of 
corruption by using the new measures of education equality that has not yet employed by the 
corruption studies. These measures are calculated from education attainment dataset from Barro 
and Lee (2000). Overall the estimations suggest that the past condition of equality in education 
distribution affects the current perceived level of corruption independently and complimentarily 
with other socioeconomic factors of civic participation. The anti-corruption effects of education 
equality remain robust through various specification changes. The following section reviews the 
literature that is relevant to our research agenda. Section 3 provides a simple theoretical model 
that allows for inequality in education amongst citizens and public officials. Section 4 illustrates 
the dataset that we will employ in the empirical analysis in Section 5-7 which in turn will search 
for the empirical evidence for the theoretical predictions in Section 3. Section 8 concludes the 
findings and gives policy implication and research opportunity. 
 
2   Literatures Review 
 
This section reviews the relevant discoveries of the determinants of corruption in order to 
address the non-monotonic relationship between education and corruption. As the studies about 
the relationship between education and corruption are diverging, this section will classify them by 
the nature of the effects. The survey focuses primarily on the results and identification strategies 
of the literature that can be useful for our investigation. 
 
2.1   The Anti-Corruption Effects of Education 
 
The relationship between education and corruption is nothing new. Scholars have praised 
the anti-corruption role of education through civic participation and political accountability. 
Several empirical studies on the causes of corruption
7
 find that education determines the 
perceived level of corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1999) formally investigate the various causes of 
corruption by using the time-varying factors in their fixed-effect estimation. The identification 
strategies in their work also include the use of instrumental variables (IV) to overcome the 
endogeneity problem of country openness and corruption. They mainly examine whether 
                                                 
7 Ades and Di Tella (1999), Ahrend (2002) and Svensson (2005), See Table 1 in Appendix for the list of other 
determinants studies 
availability of rents, in general, and market structure in particular determine the corruption level 
or not. Using World Competitive Report’s and Business International Corruption Indices in 
1980s, the results from basic cross-section analysis and panel data, controlling for country and 
time fixed effects, show that, other things being equal, in countries where domestic firms enjoy 
sheltered business and low competition, there will be more rents that can be extracted and thus 
more corruption. More importantly, they are the first people who formally verify that civil 
society, measured by human capital stock, per-capita income and political right index, can control 
corruption. 
However Ades and Di Tella (1999) did not check the anti-corruption role of civil society 
in fixed effects model as they argue that there is no variation in schooling across time. Also, they 
did not include press freedom in their civil society analysis. This is due, however, to data 
limitation problems. They have used an extremely short period of data from 1989-1990, but 
variables such as schooling might require longer time dimension than 2 years to reveal its 
variation for fixed effect model. Moreover, the press freedom quantitative data did not exist until 
1994. We address these shortcomings and try to overcome them in our empirical analysis by 
employing a longer panel data of schooling and adding more relevant factors that support civic 
participation in controlling corruption including press freedom. 
Another important work in the study of causes of corruption is Treisman (2000). This 
paper tests the broader ideas of factors that can determine the corruption level across countries. 
As he extensively includes all potential causes of corruption in his OLS and 2SLS estimations, 
one may have to place a greater emphasis on positive than negative results. Treisman focuses on 
various determinants, which range from religion and historical culture to current institutional and 
economic factors. Since his work employs generally the time-invariant factors, the main sources 
of variation for his analysis come from the cross-country differences. He primarily uses the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 1996-1998 as well as Business International’s Corruption 
index (BI) for 1980-1983. In addition, Treisman detects the potential endogeneity problem 
between per-capita income and corruption in the empirical analysis where he proposes the time-
invariant distance from the equator as an instrument for per-capita GDP. In effect, the income 
effect in reducing corruption still holds.  
Unfortunately, Treisman (2000) does not include schooling and press freedom variables 
in his analysis. Although his 4
th
 hypothesis intends to test the effect of democracy, free press and 
civic association on corruption, the variables he actually employs, in contrast to the earlier 
attempt by Ades and Di Tella, are the length of uninterrupted democracy and political rights 
index from freedom house. It is unclear that these variables do correctly capture the effect of civic 
society for many reasons. The length of democracy from Alvarez et al. (1996) is measured by just 
a dummy variable that indicates whether the country has been an uninterrupted democratic 
regime from the period of 1950-1995. However, it is unclear that the continuity in democracy is 
the only determinant of civil society and free press. Moreover, the differences in civil society and 
corruption among 23 countries with 40 years of uninterrupted democracy are substantial
8
. Also, 
the political right index from Freedom House is mainly constructed from the ratings whether the 
country has a free, fair and competitive political system or not. Even though Freedom House 
produces an exclusive quantitative score for press freedom since 1994, Treisman did not employ 
this rating into his analysis for the 4
th
 hypothesis
9
. 
As the anti-corruption effects of press freedom and education have been found in a 
number of corruption studies
10
, the explanatory power of some factors in Treisman’s analysis, 
which correlate with education and press freedom, may unintentionally incorporate the effect of 
schooling and press freedom in its explanatory power. In other words, Treisman’s estimations 
may have overestimated the anti-corruption effect of some variables that correlate with education 
and press freedom. Hence, we will contribute to this research gap by explicitly including the 
measures of schooling and free press along with other significant factors in Treisman (2000) to 
re-estimate the role of civic association and free press on corruption. 
The other recent works that find the anti-corruption effect of education on corruption are 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Svensson (2005). Unlike Ades and Di Tell (1999) and Treisman 
(2000), Svensson (2005) employs 4 different corruption indices, which include both subjective 
and objective measures
11
 of corruption. He finds robust evidences in all 4 different corruption 
indices that higher initial level of incomes and years of schooling in total population (in 1970) 
bring about lower corruption in 30 years later. Svensson concludes from his findings that 
economic development and human capital induce the institutional developments which in turn 
reduce the prevalence of corruption in the society.  
Glaeser and Saks (2006) study corruption determinants within U.S. States by using 
average objective data on corruption convictions for the period of 1976-2002 from the Justice 
Department Report and states’ education and economic characteristics. The dataset includes 
                                                 
8 India, South Africa and Mexico have been democratic for 40 years as well as Finland, Denmark, United States and 
United Kingdom 
9 The results of this hypothesis show that what matters to corruption is not the current status of democracy but the 
duration of uninterrupted democracy 
10 Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Chowdhury (2004) find the causal relationship between press freedom and corruption 
while Ades and Di Tella (1999), Ahrend (2002), Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Svensson (2005) find the causal 
relationship between education and corruption 
11 He uses the incidence of bribes from International Crime Victim Survey as an objective dependent variable along 
with corruption indices CPI, ICRG and World Bank’s control of corrption 
10,000 cases of corruption committed by government officers including conflict of interests, 
fraud, campaign-finance violations and obstruction of justice. This study uses a distinctive 
indicator of corruption compared with traditional cross-countries studies that we have reviewed 
earlier. Instead of using a typical subjective corruption index, they use data on federal conviction 
for corruption, which measures the real occurrence of corruption in each federal state. Hence, 
using more objective measures, the authors believe that they can overcome the measurement error 
and bias problem of perception-base indices and produce a more precise estimation.  
The main findings of their survey are that the more educated, richer and less unequal 
states have less corruption. Also, heterogeneity in ethnicity and earnings appear to promote 
corrupt practices. Moreover, states with more corruption convictions experienced slower growth 
in total output during the past two decades. However, there appears to be a weak support on the 
negative impact of income and size of local government. Also, there is no evidence that the 
degree of regulation brings about higher level of corruption. These results reinforce the argument 
mentioned earlier in the introduction by Svensson (2005). Unlike the size of government or 
regulation, income and education are important factors, which raise the civic participation. Thus, 
the corrupted behaviour of government officers is strongly motivated by the potential costs of 
being caught rather than by the government reward. In other words, the external civic demand for 
greater accountability driven by education and income can effectively discipline the public 
servant. This finding strongly supports the prominent study about crime and punishment by 
Becker (1968). Also, these findings strongly support the view that civic participation can help 
reduce corruption in the U.S
12
. 
From a methodological standpoint, the identification strategy in Glaeser and Saks’ study 
is an important contribution in the literature on corruption. They are ones of the very few 
researchers
13
 who utilise past values of income and education from 1970 census data in the 
regression analysis. Stock of human capital is measured by the share of adult population with 4 or 
more years of college completion. This choice reflects the idea of the authors to measure the 
stock of advanced level of human capital. They instrument this education measure by using the 
share of church members in the state that are Congregationalist in 1890 census data. The authors 
argue that Congregationalism is associated with the elites and their commitment to education, 
thus the education system in those states with more Congregationalists developed faster, and 
these states still remain more educated today than others. For income, they measure by the 
logarithm of median household income in 1970 census and instrument by the median family wage 
                                                 
12 Reinikka and Svensson (2005) presents evidences in least developed country that support this argument 
13 To my best of knowledge, the only work on the determinant of corruption study 
and salary income in 1940 and the geographic location of each state. The latter instrument reflects 
the cost of transportation and economic activities. The states with natural harbor and river can be 
substantially more productive. When past education and income can predict the level of 
corruption today, Glaeser and Saks suggest that political institutions, which constrain public 
officers’ incentive to become corrupted, are weaker in states with poorer and less educated 
citizens. Pursuing this idea to search for a similar instrument for education in cross-country level 
can be more difficult, we will discuss this task in Section 7.4. 
 
2.2   The Adverse Effects of Education on Corruption  
 
Ahrend (2002) and Frechette (2006) find striking results that an increase in human capital 
can increase the level of corruption in the society. This section reviews and analyses their unusual 
findings and the identification strategies. We argue that these adverse effects of education on 
corruption are ambiguous. 
The main findings in Frechette (2006) are that the availability of rents driven by income 
and trade restrictions increase corruption. He also finds that an increase in education measured by 
the primary schooling enrollment rate in total population increases the perceived level of 
corruption in the society. Additionally, from a methodological stand point, Frechette (2006) 
makes an important contribution to Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Triesman (2000) by employing 
the new time-varying instruments
14
 in his fixed effects estimations to identify the country’s time 
varying and time invariant unobservable country’s characteristics that correlate to both corruption 
and the explanatory variables.  
Similarly, Ahrend (2002) finds that education increases corruption when the media 
freedom in the society is very limited. Specifically, Ahrend uses the following theoretical model 
to support his argument; 
U(b,h, F,w) = w + B(b,hB )(1− PD (hB ,b, M (hm ))) − PD (hB ,b, M (hM )) ⋅F  
This government utility function represents the bureaucrat’s problem of choosing bribe 
strategy. The expected return to bribery is the rents he extracts (B), which depends on the bribe 
rate (b) and his own stock of human capital  ( hB ), with the possibility of being detected and 
sentenced PD (hB ,b, M (hM )) , which is a function of b, hB and monitoring capacity (M). He 
assumes that M depends solely on the stock of human capital of monitors hM and also assumes 
that hM = hB . This model predicts that an increase in human capital has two diverse effects; (1) 
                                                 
14 He uses the logarithm of population and the income level of the greatest importer as the instruments for a share of 
import and per-capita income respectively 
Increase corruption through the rise of the bureaucrat’s productivity and the skills to make 
corruption sophisticated, (2) Reduce corruption through the rise of monitoring capacity which can 
be seen as the effectiveness and the independency of monitoring institutions (P). Hence, the 
crucial factor, which determines the nature of the net effect of education on corruption, is the 
effectiveness of monitoring institution, mathematically speaking the partial derivative of P with 
respect to M. Ahrend assumes that the determinant of effectiveness and independency of 
monitoring institutions are free of press and independency of judicial system. Ahrend also finds 
the empirical evidences from the cross-national regressions that education reduces the perceived 
level of corruption only if the efficiency of the monitoring capacity in the society measuring by 
press freedom is high enough
15
. 
We argue that Ahrend’s theoretical conclusions are driven by the unusual strong 
assumptions in his theoretical model. Firstly, he assumes an identical human capital stock 
between public officials and monitors, which is a very strong assumption. As we have discussed 
earlier, the large education gap between the citizen and the public officer can potentially create 
room for corruption, thus this strong assumption prevents Ahrend’s analysis to identify the anti-
corruption effect of the equality in the distribution of education. Secondly, he concludes that 
freedom of the press and judicial independency determine the nature of education’s role, however 
these two factors do not existed in his theoretical model. We, thus, aim to contribute to Ahrend’s 
work by relaxing the assumption of identical human capital stock and explicitly incorporating 
press freedom and judicial independency into monitoring capacity’s (M) function in the following 
theoretical section. 
From the empirical standpoint, we argue that the findings in Frechette (2006) and Ahrend 
(2002) that schooling increase corruption is due to their choice of education measures. Frechette 
(2006) argues that an increase in education raises the availability of general rents and also 
increases bureaucrats’ skills in performing corrupted acts. The later argument is unclear, 
however, when concerning the measure of schooling he uses which is the current ratio of primary 
school enrollment, regardless of age, to the total population of the age group that officially relate 
to the primary school level. Ahrend (2002) and Frechette (2006) argue that this choice is 
preferred to Ades and Di Tella (1999)’s secondary school attainment because it has more 
variation. Interestingly, Ahrend (2002) also employs the same school enrollment dataset from 
world development indicator as Frechette’s (2006) and obtains similar result that education 
increase corruption. This choice of schooling variable and its interpretation are quite unclear for 
                                                 
15 Specifically, education reduce corruption only in the countries with the “free” status of press freedom index by 
Freedom House 
several reasons. An increase in the current share of total enrollment in primary schooling among 
the population should not affect the government officer’s corruption skill for two reasons. Firstly, 
there is no convincing reason for the connection between today public officer’s skill of corruption 
and today enrollment ratio of population at the age of primary school. Obviously, the age of 
public officers are substantially older than primary school age (e.g. 6-13), in fact, primary school 
qualification is typically insufficient for applying to bureaucratic jobs. Secondly, the enrollment 
rate is a weak proxy for human capital stock. When the school dropout rate is high, especially in 
the developing countries, this indicator becomes severely misleading. Glaeser et al. (2007) 
support our argument by showing that enrollment data conceptually reflects the investment flows 
rather than the stocks of human capital. 
As the theoretical assumptions and choices of education measures in Ahrend (2002) and 
Frechette (2006) are unclear, this paper will test the robustness of their results by relaxing some 
of the strong assumptions and using the education attainment data from Barro and Lee (2000) 
instead of the enrollment data. Moreover, Ahrend’s argument about the determining role of press 
freedom on the anti-corruption effect of education is based on the qualitative measure of press 
freedom from Freedom House.
16
 We will revisit his argument by employing the quantitative 
measure of press freedom from Freedom House. 
To conclude this review, cross-country and within-country evidences suggest that 
education significantly determines the level of corruption. The measures of education that are 
found to be the determinants of corruption include the historical and current levels of education 
attainments and the current enrollment rates across populations. Yet, no single study examines the 
role of the equality in the distribution of education on corruption. Furthermore, similar to other 
determinants, education is subjected to simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity problems. 
Researchers, thus, employ the methods of instrumental variable and panel data estimation to 
overcome these problems and estimate the more precise effect of education on corruption.   
Existing studies present two diverse types of education effects on corruption; its 
promoting and controlling effects. Yet those studies do not apply an appropriate theoretical or 
empirical treatment to study the non-monotonic relationship between education and corruption, 
instead they either claim that there is only one type or argue that the type depends upon the 
condition of its complementary factor like press freedom. Consequently, the effects of education 
are found to be “fragile”
17
 and highly sensitive to specification changes as the chosen measure of 
aggregate human capital can not explicitly control for the non-monotonicity in the relationship 
                                                 
16 They divide countries into 3 broad groups by the status of freedom 
17 Many studies including the sensitivity analysis, e.g. Serra (2006), find insignificant effect of education 
between education and corruption. Moreover, these results cannot provide a clear explanation 
about how an increase in human capital affects corruption in reality, thus policy makers and 
practitioners receive very limited implications from the current identification strategy.  
Studying the causal relationship between education and corruption requires a distinctive 
identification strategy that can control for heterogeneity of education in the economy. More 
importantly, it requires a comprehensive and convincing story to explain how it works. These 
issues will be investigated in the next section. 
 
3   Theoretical Model 
 
This section aims to propose the theoretical foundation for testing the hypothesis that 
education, and in particular its distribution can play a vital role in determining the optimal level 
of corruption in the society. We argue that education inequality is the primary cause of 
heterogeneity among agents which affects the optimal level of corruption in society. We will 
begin by presenting the static model of the bureaucrat’s optimisation problem when the officer 
encounters the civic monitoring threat from local citizens. This single period model, which builds 
on Ahrend’s (2002) and implements some necessary modifications following similar works by 
Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Gerrber and Green (1999), will show that the distribution of 
human capital is crucial in determining the bribery level of bureaucrats. The predictions from this 
reduced-form model will then be used as a foundation for empirical analysis in Section 6-8. 
 
3.1   The Economy, Citizens and Bureaucrats 
 
 The economy consists of two types of agent; the citizen (C) who work and earn wage 
which is an increasing function, (.)E , of their education attainment ( ( )C CW E e= ), and the 
government official (g) who authorises the public goods provision. As in Persson and Tabellini 
(2000), there are N citizens with identical preference given by 
UC = c + H (G) = (1− t)WC (eC ) + H (G)  (3A) 
 where c, t, eC , G denote consumption, taxes, citizen’s education attainment and net 
public good respectively; while H(.) is a concave and increasing function. The distribution of 
education attainment among citizens is predetermined and will be discussed shortly.  
Each citizen has a different perspective towards the bureaucrat’s ethical standards
18
 
which are normalised into one dimensional parameter represented by the bribe rate, b. All citizens 
                                                 
18 See Dwivedi (1967) and Table 6-7 in Appendix 3 
receive the same public information regarding the bribery from the media. However, each citizen 
interprets news differently subject to his or her private human capital stock. Put differently, the 
awareness and tolerance toward information about corruption that the citizen extracts from the 
news increases with the citizen’s private stock of human capital.  
Also, the levels of press freedom and education are exogenously predetermined and 
government officials cannot manipulate these determinants of civic society. This reflects the fact 
that stock of human capital and press freedom take time to accumulate as they rely on various 
exogenous factors outside the specific society. This idea is well captured by the empirical 
evidence that show persistency of the variation in education and press freedom
19
 across time. 
However, corruption transactions require very short period of time to accomplish and getaway. 
Hence, the only choice variable of the government official in this simple model is the size of the 
bribe, b, regarding other predetermined variables. We would like to focus on the changes in the 
government officials’ behavior given the changes in inequality in education attainment, which 
alter the probability of the corrupted official being caught (P). Our model intends to explain why 
there is more perceived corruption in some countries than others rather than how corruption in 
one specific country evolves across time.  
 
3.2   Education 
 
We relax the assumption of identical schoolings of Ahrend (2002) by assuming that 
citizens and bureaucrats obtain discrete years of schooling normally distributed according to the 
distribution function N(e ,δe
2 ) . There is an inequality (skewness) in education distribution when 
the median level of education attainment is below the mean and e = 1 . Additionally, working 
with the government requires a substantial level of schooling, thus the government official attains 
education higher than the average and median schooling level of the society. Formally, these 
assumptions can be concluded as em ≤ e < eg . 
 
3.3   Corruption 
 
 The government official works as the provider of public goods G, which is financed by 
the flat income tax rate. There are two types of returns from being in the public office; private 
benefits and public welfare. The private gains for official are official wage, Wg and the expected 
return of taking bribes. We assume that the official can divert a proportion of the public goods, 
                                                 
19 See Section 5.2  
b ∈[0,1]  in the form of monetary bribe (B), B = b ⋅G . Thus, government spending and bribery 
are financed by the flat income tax, M = t ⋅wc ⋅N = G + B  where wc  is the citizens’ average 
income and N is the total population number. 
Corruption will be noticed and prosecuted with probability P. However, the bureaucrat 
can make corruption sophisticated and more difficult to track down as his education attainment, 
eg , increases. The educated bureaucrat’s best strategy is to make corruption as sophisticated and 
secretive as possible in order to maximise the expected gain from rent seeking. From experience 
and inside information, the government officer knows the quality of the press freedom (I) and 
education equality (σ) in his service area and then optimises the bribery strategy (b) accordingly. 
Although the government officer cannot control the media market, by assumption, when 
corruption becomes complicated, it reduces the chance for the citizen to assimilate the revealing 
piece of information. This creates an imprecision of information on the bribe rate that uneducated 
citizens observe. The empirical evidences presented in Dwivedi (1967) show that this group of 
citizen is likely to downwardly misevaluate the level of corruption and has less incentive to 
participate in anti-corruption initiative
20
.  
If caught bribing, the government official will face a punishment, which, for simplicity, 
we assume to be a monetary cost, F. Nonetheless, when the political competition is tense, the 
public officer will be under political pressure from the central government to uphold the provision 
of G. The relative weight, γ ∈[0,1] , of the officer’s concern over the public goods provision to 
his private gains represents this political pressure
21
. Equation 3B describes the government 
official’s original utility function while Equation 3C substitutes G with the budget constraint. 
Ug = Wg + B(b)(1− P) − P(eg ,b, I ,em ) ⋅F +γ (G)  (3B) 
Ug =WG + (1 - P)B − P ⋅F +γ (M − B)  (3C) 
In this section we derive optimal bureaucrat’s bribery rate (b) and carry out some 
comparative static analysis using the main properties of interest. We depart from Ahrend’s model 
by relaxing the assumption of perfect equality in schoolings and explicitly include press freedom 
into P. We assume certainty in the prosecution of corruption. Therefore, the probability of 
catching the corrupted officer (P) is primarily increasing in the determinants of civic monitoring 
capacity; the media efficiency to minimise the imprecision of available information measuring by 
press freedom ( I ∈[0,1] , 1= free), the size of bribe (b) and the equality in education (σ ). 
Making P an increasing function on b reflects the fact that when the briberies are large, it is more 
                                                 
20 See Table 6-7 in Appendix 3 
21 Alternatively, may represents the type of officer, honest or corrupted 
obvious to be noticed and challenged. In addition, as discussed earlier, to capture an education 
inequality aspect, we assume that P is determined by the human capital stocks of the median 
citizens and bureaucrats; relative to the mean schooling of the society ( e ). Alternatively, P can 
be seen as the observable amount of rents in the public point of view. Our hypothesis is that as 
press freedom and education equality are improved the government officers will be more 
accountable for his or her rent seeking activities. Last but not least, as the income of the 
individual is increasing in education attainment, it is anticipated that increases in income driven 
by an increase in individual’s schooling, improves civic monitoring (P) and reduces corruption
22
. 
P =
I ⋅ (
em
e
)
(
eg
e
)
⋅b =
I ⋅ em
eg
⋅b  (3D) 
Equation 3D shows that mean schoolings are cancelled out, hence /m ge e  ratio increases 
when the gap between the education attainments of the median citizen and the bureaucrat 
decreases. This ratio indicates education equality in the economy, let σ =
em
eg
. 
3.5   Optimal bribe level 
 
 Equations 3E-3G show FOC and SOC of the government official’s utility with respect to 
b. Equation 3F presents the optimal bribe rate which is a function of political pressure (γ), 
monetary fine (F), press freedom (I) and education equality (σ) while Equation 3G shows its 
concavity.  
∂Ug
∂b
= G − γG − FIσ − 2bIσG = 0  (3E)  (3F) 
 (3G) 
We then calculate the optimal bribe level with respect to the determinants of interest. 
Equation 3H-3I present the effects of changes in education inequality and press freedom 
respectively. 
 (3H)  (3I) 
 Equation 3H and 3I represent the anti-corruption return to education equality and press 
freedom in fighting corruption. More importantly, apart from independent effects, both 
                                                 
22 Although the income effect hypothesis is not explicitly showed in the model, it will be checked empirically 
determinants of civic monitoring capacity work together in eliminating corruption. This finding 
contributes to Ahrend (2002) which implicitly shows that the anti-corruption role of education 
depends on monitoring capacity. Our finding explicitly illustrates that education equality and 
press freedom work together in controlling corruption through civic monitoring. To illustrate, 
using Equation 3H we assume that the bureaucrat is indifferent between private benefits and 
public goods provision (γ=0.5) due to the typical political pressure. Figure 3A shows that the anti-
corruption effect of education equality is quadratic and increasing with press freedom. Similarly, 
the anti-corruption effect of press freedom is quadratic and increasing with education equality. 
Additionally, Equation 3H and 3I prove that political pressure complementarily promotes the 
effects of education equality and press freedom. 
Figure 3A Anti-corruption Return to Education Equation when (γ=0.5) 
 
 From Equation 3J and 3K, political pressure γ and monetary fine (F) also have 
independent anti-corruption effects. The political pressure role is increasing with press freedom 
and education equality; while the role of monetary fine decreases with the size of public goods 
provision. This reflects the fact that what matters for constraining corruption are not the absolute 
value of punishment but the relative value of punishment and the value of the available rents. 
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 (3K)  
 To conclude, this section illustrates the theoretical foundation for our research agenda. 
Predictions from the comparative analysis of the reduced-form model proves that improvements 
in education equality, press freedom, political pressure on bureaucrat and magnitude of 
punishment (I, σ , F, γ ) can reduce the optimal bribery level chosen by the government officials 
in the economy. Intuitively, when the inequality in education is substantial, it significantly 
reduces the credibility of civic monitoring threat against corruption, which results in the 
persistence of the misuse of public office. Education equality also shows its supplementary roles 
in curbing corruption. The next Section will seek for empirical supports for these predictions. 
 
4   Data and Analysis 
 
4.1   Subjective Corruption Indices 
 
We use cross-country subjective indices of perceived level of corruption from 3 different 
sources; Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), International Country 
Risk Guide’s Corruption Index (ICRG) and Daniel Kaufmann’s Control of Corruption (WB). All 
corruption indices are re-scaled to 0-10 basis, where 10 stands for countries with the least 
corruption. WB and CPI indices are constructed by aggregating a number of corruption indicators 
from over 10 different sources and combine with their own country surveys that target the experts 
including international businessman, risk analyst and local citizens. On the other hand, ICRG 
relies solely on its individual survey. From this limitation of data source, therefore, one might 
consider ICRG index as the least reliable among the 3 indices we are using when it comes to 
identifying the true level of corruption. However, one incomparable advantage of ICRG index is 
its longest availability from 1984-2003 whereas the indices for CPI and WB are only available 
from 1995 onwards. Nevertheless, these 3 corruption indices are very much similar by design and 
variation. In fact, the correlations between them from 1995 to 2005 are well above 0.8. 
Table 2 in Appendix 3 summarises all corruption indices by year. The average perceived 
level of corruption has been increasing across the globe while its dispersion has been decreasing. 
The mean values of each index are very close to each other throughout the time. All indices will 
be employed as the dependent variable in 3 different regression specifications; cross-national 
OLS analysis, pooled OLS and Panel Fixed Effect model. The first specification will employ the 
averaged values of indices between 1995 and 2005. On the other hand, in pooled OLS and panel 
fixed effects model, as all education variables are available in the 5 years basis, the corruption 
indices will be an average value of the periods of 4 years around the time of analysis, (e.g. an 
average of year 2002-2005 represents for year 2005). As CPI and WB indices are available 
between 1995-2005 while ICRG index is available between 1984-2003, pooled OLS and fixed 
effect estimations that use CPI and WB indices for its dependent variable will employ 3 periods 
of repeated cross-country dataset whereas ICRG regression will employ 4 periods of dataset 
between 1990-2005. 
Variation of Corruption Indices 
To estimate the within-country time trend and the significance of country specific effect 
of ICRG corruption indices between 1980 and 2005, we estimate these linear time trend models; 
it i t itICRG dµ β ν= + +  
The null hypothesis of equal country specific effect ( : )i iµ µ= ∀  are rejected (µ=6.875) 
and β equals to -0.165, with a significance level at 1 percent interval, thus corruption is 
significantly different across countries and time. However when we split countries into regional 
groups and re-estimate the above model, some groups
23
 show no sign of difference in corruption 
across time dimension. Moreover, having checked the correlation of corruption index within 10 
years interval also reveals that it is never less than 0.7. Therefore, although corruption varies 
overtime, it is found to be very persistent. This could give a serious problem in panel data 
estimation that attempt to identify the causal relationship within country. Consequently, it is 
anticipated that the variation in ICRG corruption index comes primarily from the cross-country 
variation rather than the within country variation.  
 
The Validity of Subjective Corruption Indices 
Due to its subjective nature, the accuracy of corruption indices in measuring the 
countries’ actual levels of corruption individually and comparatively is widely debated. Clearly, 
the participants in corruption index survey are different from country to country in terms of 
personal tolerance against corruption. For example, the questionnaire participants in TI’s survey 
were asked to rate the perceived level of corruption from the scale of 1-7, Lambsdorff (2007). 
Therefore it is possible that the country-specific factors play a vital role in the measurement error 
of corruption index. A potential problem which arises from this flaw is that when using the cross-
country variation in perceived level of corruption, the estimated differences in rating from 
between and within a country could artificially deviate from the actual differences. Nevertheless, 
Frechette (2006) argues that this preconceived bias affects the level of estimation across countries 
but not across time dimension if the survey methods are consistent over time.  
TI replies to this comment by arguing that their subjects across countries were 
“businessman with international perspective”, hence they have had the standardised approach to 
evaluate the perceived corruption level domestically and internationally, Lambsdorff (2007). In 
other words, TI claims that their surveyed businessmen across countries are treated “as if” the 
identical subject who can precisely identify the perceived level of corruption in each country. 
Other sources of subjective indices of corruption also rely on this safeguard including WB and 
                                                 
23 Latin America, Middle East, South East Asia and Least Developed Countries 
ICRG. Clearly, this is a strong assumption that raises the concern over the use of the subjective 
indices of corruption. Nevertheless, it is too costly and infeasible to conduct the perfect cross-
country index of corruption that can overcome the above arguments. Furthermore, almost all 
empirical works in corruption study employ these 3 corruption indices in their analysis. Yet the 
interpretation derived from these subjective indices should be used with caution. We will estimate 
our empirical model by using all 3 corruption indices as dependent variables to check the 
consistency of the results. 
 
5.2 Educational Determinants of Civic Monitoring 
 
This section presents the description of cross-country education attainment dataset in 
Barro and Lee (2000) (B&L) and the strategies to identify the measure of education equality from 
this dataset. As discussed earlier, B&L dataset is a superior statistic of human capital stock to the 
enrollment rate used by Ahrend (2002) and Frechette (2006), which can be subject to various 
measurement error problems. BL dataset contains two main measures of cross-national education 
attainment; the percentage of total population who attained four different levels of schooling and 
the average years of schooling across population in three different education levels. The earlier 
information is presented in the left panel of Table 5A while the right panel presents the latter. 
Four levels of education consist of no schooling, primary schooling, secondary schooling and 
tertiary schooling. According to the international standard, primary education represents 6 years 
of schooling while secondary and tertiary educations represent 12 and 16 years of schoolings 
respectively. This benchmark will shortly be an important assumption in the analysis. Each 
B&L’s education variable is available in 5 years intervals from 1960-2000. The education data of 
adult population at age 25 and above in B&L are being employed
24
 in our analysis. The 
description of B&L dataset is presented in Table 5A below. 
On average, the overall situation of education attainment around the globe has been 
improved between 1960-2000. For instance, there had been less population with no formal 
schooling (from 45% to 26%) and the mean of education attainment had risen from 3.35 to 6.06 
in B&L’s calculation and from 2.57 years to 5.10 years in our calculation
25
. In the next part we 
generate the new measure of education equality by using the information from Table 4A. 
Table 4A Descriptive Statistics Barro-Lee dataset (2000) 
                                                 
24 We choose 25 instead of 15 since student of age between 15-25 can pursue different during this age gap, this missing 
information can create the bias to education effect in the analysis 
25 Our calculation aims to identify the year of schooling attained by the citizen at the mean position of education 
distribution which is differ from the purpose of BL’s calculation that identifies the average years of schooling in total 
population, nevertheless the correlation between two measures is equal to 1 
 Year Mean Median Max Min Std. dev. Year Mean Median Max Min Std. dev.
No Schooling Primary Schooling 
1960 45.92 46.60 99.00 0.00 33.07 1960 2.60 2.22 7.32 0.05 1.85
1965 45.16 44.70 98.40 0.00 32.67 1965 2.63 2.27 7.21 0.07 1.82
1970 43.59 40.70 99.60 0.50 32.83 1970 2.75 2.54 7.13 0.02 1.88
1975 41.98 36.70 98.20 0.60 32.03 1975 2.84 2.70 7.53 0.08 1.83
1980 37.86 32.60 92.70 0.00 30.49 1980 3.09 2.84 7.51 0.30 1.83
1985 34.65 29.80 90.80 0.30 28.51 1985 3.26 3.24 7.52 0.37 1.74
1990 31.24 24.50 88.90 0.00 26.72 1990 3.49 3.57 7.66 0.45 1.71
1995 28.30 19.80 87.40 0.00 24.95 1995 3.70 3.70 7.66 0.53 1.66
2000 26.16 17.50 86.40 0.00 23.43 2000 3.83 3.88 7.67 0.58 1.61
Primary Schooling Secondary Schooling
1960 39.70 37.50 89.30 0.30 24.87 1960 0.66 0.36 4.59 0.01 0.82
1965 40.22 39.20 85.60 0.80 24.02 1965 0.68 0.36 4.55 0.01 0.81
1970 38.71 38.10 86.80 0.10 22.75 1970 0.84 0.54 4.55 0.01 0.93
1975 38.28 40.50 82.00 0.60 21.71 1975 0.95 0.67 4.01 0.03 0.94
1980 38.00 39.80 79.80 3.20 19.65 1980 1.18 0.87 5.09 0.04 1.10
1985 38.02 39.10 72.70 4.60 17.54 1985 1.33 1.05 5.08 0.05 1.11
1990 36.88 36.20 65.40 4.80 15.76 1990 1.55 1.28 5.08 0.08 1.18
1995 36.24 35.65 64.40 8.20 14.36 1995 1.74 1.49 5.00 0.09 1.24
2000 36.14 37.05 64.30 9.10 13.50 2000 1.86 1.64 5.05 0.14 1.27
Secondary Schooling Tertiary Schooling
1960 11.55 6.50 61.00 0.20 13.13 1960 0.08 0.04 0.53 0.00 0.10
1965 11.71 6.80 58.90 0.20 12.80 1965 0.08 0.04 0.58 0.00 0.11
1970 14.27 9.40 63.90 0.30 14.33 1970 0.10 0.07 0.68 0.00 0.13
1975 15.54 11.40 61.20 0.40 13.69 1975 0.13 0.09 0.81 0.00 0.16
1980 18.59 14.60 62.90 0.50 14.63 1980 0.18 0.11 0.96 0.00 0.19
1985 20.61 17.60 60.00 0.70 14.65 1985 0.22 0.15 1.08 0.00 0.21
1990 23.42 22.40 69.60 1.40 15.18 1990 0.27 0.23 1.45 0.00 0.25
1995 25.72 25.55 66.70 1.70 15.72 1995 0.31 0.27 1.49 0.00 0.27
2000 26.45 26.45 62.50 2.40 15.21 2000 0.36 0.32 1.61 0.01 0.30
Tertiary Schooling Total Schooling 
1960 2.35 1.10 20.00 0.00 3.47 1960 3.35 2.95 9.56 0.07 2.52
1965 2.53 1.30 19.50 0.00 3.50 1965 3.40 2.89 9.42 0.10 2.52
1970 3.22 2.00 21.50 0.00 4.17 1970 3.71 3.05 10.09 0.04 2.70
1975 4.20 2.70 30.90 0.00 5.26 1975 3.93 3.40 11.00 0.14 2.71
1980 5.56 3.40 37.40 0.10 6.60 1980 4.45 3.77 11.91 0.37 2.86
1985 6.69 4.50 38.10 0.10 7.07 1985 4.81 4.39 11.71 0.42 2.80
1990 8.34 6.90 45.20 0.10 8.41 1990 5.31 5.14 12.00 0.55 2.85
1995 9.71 7.95 48.70 0.10 9.12 1995 5.75 5.52 12.18 0.69 2.90
2000 11.26 9.40 53.00 0.20 10.10 2000 6.06 5.74 12.25 0.76 2.90
Percentage of School Attainment in Total Adult Population Average Years of Schooling in Total Adult Population
 
 
New Measures of Education Equality 
Identifying education equality from B&L dataset is nothing new. Castello and Domenech 
(2002) and Thomas et al. (2003) have calculated the Gini coefficient of education distribution 
(Gh) and the ratio between education attained by lowest and highest quintiles, from B&L’s 
education attainment data. In addition, the economic growth literature
26
 employs the standard 
deviation of education attainment (ESD) as a proxy for education inequality. However ESD is not 
suitable for identifying education equality in our framework. It measures primarily the absolute 
dispersion of human capital across population but does not control for the differences in the mean 
of the distributions. As, some low-educated countries can have the same standard deviation in 
education attainment as the high-educated countries, the interpretation of anti-corruption effect of 
the distribution of education measured by ESD can be misleading.  
On the other hand, although Gh captures the information of education equality of interest, 
there are two crucial methodological shortcomings of this indicator. The Gini coefficient itself 
cannot precisely identify the relative distance between human capital stocks within the 
                                                 
26 Birdsall and Londoño (1997), López et al. (1998) and Park (2006) 
distribution. It rather identifies the distribution of human capital stock across total population. In 
fact, the same value of Gini coefficient can represent different shapes of Lorenz curves. Putting it 
differently, when the relative level of education attainment between the median educated citizen 
and public officers (σ) varies, the value of Gini coefficient does not necessarily identify this 
difference. Another shortcoming of the Gini coefficient is the limitation of the granularity of the 
measurements. For instance, using the same distribution of education attainment, the Gini 
coefficient calculated from 10 levels of schoolings (high granularity) will often yield a higher 
value (less equal) than Gini coefficient calculated from 5 level of schoolings (low granularity), 
and vice versa. Since B&L’s dataset in education attainment contains only 4 different levels of 
schoolings, it is likely that the Gini coefficient calculated from this dataset will overestimate the 
true equality of distribution in education attainment. As our analysis that focuses on the relative 
levels of schoolings we need a more precise indicator to identify σ from B&L’s dataset. 
 To identify σ in B&L’s data set, we calculate the years of schooling attained by the 
median citizen (Median) and by public officers. To locate the Median, we treat B&L’s dataset as 
a simple group data where the percentage of population graduated in each level of schooling 
represents the frequency. For the public officer, we assume that the public officer’s year of 
schooling is represented by the years of schooling attained by the (4
th
) quartile group (Q4) in the 
distribution of education. Using simple statistical formulas one can identify σ from B&L’s dataset 
as follow; 
Notations 
i   : index for an education level  
m : index for an education level which contain median 
b  : index for an education level before the median class 
f   : percentage of population  
cy : cumulative years of schooling 
cf  :  cumulative percentage of population 
B  :  lower bound of class containing median 
I   :  class interval  
 
Define 
   
  
As mentioned earlier we assume the length of schooling class interval (I) as 6, 6 and 4 
respectively. Thus, in the calculation of the Mean, cy takes the value of 6, 12 and 16 while f and 
avy use the information from left and right panels of Table 5A accordingly. It is important to note 
that using the traditional midpoint value instead of (cy+avy) can overestimate the true value of 
mean schooling, as one may see from Table 4A that the average secondary and tertiary schooling 
years have never reached 2 years. For Median and Q4, the calculations are comparable
27
. The 
class that contains the median is located by calculating the cumulative distribution of the 
information in the right panel of Table 4A. Therefore, σ is identified as Median/Q4. We also 
calculate the coefficient of variation (CV), the measure of dispersion in education distribution that 
controls for the mean, from B&L’s data set. All results of the above calculations are presented in 
Table 4B.  
Table 4B shows several interesting features. The mean years of schooling of the 4
th
 
quartile was below 5 years in 1960 and increased to about 10 years in 2000. Apparently, 5-10 
years of schooling is equivalent to normal secondary school qualification, which is the typical 
criterion for public servant employment. This evidence supports the external validity of the 
assumption that uses the 4
th
 quartile as a proxy of public servant schooling. In addition, on 
average the Median had been lower than the Mean in the education distribution throughout 40 
years of B&L’s dataset. Therefore, statistically, Median is the superior measure of central 
tendency of education distribution than the Mean in B&L data set. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that around 1/5 of countries in B&L’s dataset had more than 50% of adult population with 
no formal schooling
28
. Undeniably, in this case, the schooling year of the median citizen equals to 
0. As a result, the typical minimum values of the Median in Table 4B are 0. 
In term of the dispersion in education attainment, different measures of dispersion yield 
diverse information. In table 4A, the standard deviation of average years of schooling in total 
population had risen from 2.52 in 1960 to 2.90 in 2000. One can notice that the primary source of 
increasing variation came from the attainment of secondary and tertiary education. The standard 
deviation in Table 4B shows the same intuition as Table4A. However, three other measures of 
education equality, namely Median/Q4 (σ), the coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient of 
education, show that cross-country education attainment has been more equal in 2000 than it has 
                                                 
27 As f represents the percentage of population, n equals to 100 
28 This pattern is highly persistent in some countries over time (e.g. Algeria, Iran, Central African Republic and 
Pakistan). 
been in 1960. This contradictory finding is driven by the fact that ESD does not control for the 
mean of education distribution. Hence, researchers should use this measure with caution. 
 
Table 4B New Measures of Education Equality 
Year Mean Median Max Min Std. dev. Year Mean Median Max Min Std. dev.
Mean Std. dev.
1960 2.57 1.89 8.30 0.03 2.40 1960 1.19 1.21 3.01 0 0.51
1965 2.62 1.89 8.27 0.02 2.40 1965 1.19 1.21 2.89 0 0.50
1970 2.90 2.11 8.94 0.02 2.56 1970 1.23 1.19 3.46 0 0.50
1975 3.08 2.43 9.26 0.07 2.58 1975 1.29 1.24 3.24 0.44 0.39
1980 3.57 2.92 11.20 0.08 2.76 1980 1.34 1.27 3.52 0.75 0.39
1985 3.90 3.41 11.05 0.10 2.73 1985 1.34 1.29 3.05 0.81 0.35
1990 4.38 4.10 11.39 0.16 2.80 1990 1.35 1.26 3.07 0.85 0.37
1995 4.79 4.60 11.59 0.23 2.85 1995 1.33 1.25 2.99 0 0.37
2000 5.10 4.94 11.65 0.29 2.87 2000 1.33 1.24 2.90 0 0.36
Median Median/Q4
1960 1.98 1.00 8.55 0 2.38 1960 0.21 0.12 0.61 0 0.23
1965 2.03 1.14 8.13 0 2.31 1965 0.22 0.16 0.60 0 0.22
1970 2.30 1.79 8.96 0 2.54 1970 0.23 0.22 0.63 0 0.23
1975 2.43 2.09 9.37 0 2.64 1975 0.24 0.26 0.64 0 0.23
1980 2.87 2.48 10.57 0 2.91 1980 0.26 0.31 0.69 0 0.23
1985 3.17 2.96 11.16 0 3.01 1985 0.28 0.33 0.67 0 0.23
1990 3.70 3.64 12.45 0 3.22 1990 0.30 0.37 0.69 0 0.23
1995 4.20 4.37 12.23 0 3.31 1995 0.33 0.41 0.69 0 0.22
2000 4.59 4.53 12.73 0 3.32 2000 0.35 0.42 0.77 0 0.22
Q4 Coef. Var.
1960 4.92 7.04 16.36 0 4.86 1960 2.16 0.66 27.48 0.08 3.87
1965 5.16 7.23 14.98 0 4.73 1965 2.19 0.63 36.98 0.07 4.53
1970 5.54 7.51 15.58 0 5.13 1970 1.92 0.51 28.44 0.06 3.64
1975 5.63 7.56 17.57 0 5.32 1975 1.40 0.46 12.24 0.08 2.14
1980 6.64 8.25 18.61 0 5.55 1980 1.08 0.43 11.44 0.12 1.75
1985 7.19 8.61 19.23 0 5.74 1985 0.86 0.39 9.88 0.11 1.38
1990 8.59 9.88 41.70 0 6.91 1990 0.65 0.32 6.29 0.11 0.93
1995 9.66 10.85 22.44 0 5.86 1995 0.55 0.28 4.75 0.11 0.73
2000 10.43 11.39 21.97 0 5.66 2000 0.48 0.26 3.98 0.11 0.61  
 
The subsequent empirical analysis will use Median/Q4 as the main indicator in regression 
analysis to identify anti-corruption effect of education equality while the coefficient of variation 
(CV) and Gini coefficient of education (Gh) will be used as a robustness check. 
 
Variation of Education Measures  
To estimate the within-country time trend and the significance of country specific effect 
of 3 measures of equality in the distribution of education attainment between 1980-2005, we 
estimate these linear time trend models as follow; 
/ 4 0.184 0.017it i t itMedian Q d υ= + +  
0.566 0.019it i t itGini d υ= − +  
1.968 0.016it i t itCV d υ= − +  
The null hypothesis of equal country specific effect is rejected in all 3 regressions which 
tell us that the differences between measures of education equality across countries are 
significant. Furthermore, the effects of linear time trends in the first two models are positive and 
negative respectively. They are also highly significant whereas the effect of linear time trend in 
coefficient of variation (CV)’s model is not significantly different from 0. These facts tell us that 
the values of education equality measures (Median/Q4 and Gini) are significantly different across 
time dimension. Moreover, its sign and magnitude suggest that the distribution of education 
across the globe, on average, had been fairly improved. This result confirms the earlier 
observation on education equality measures in Table 5B. Nevertheless, the correlation between 
Gh within 10 years interval is never less than 0.97 which indicate that Gh is very persistent across 
time
29
. Therefore, cross-country differences are the primary source of variation to identify the 
relationship between education equality and corruption. 
 
4.3 Other Determinants of Civic Monitoring 
 
To measure the freedom of press (I), the quantitative press freedom score complied by 
Freedom House is employed. This surveyed data evaluates the freedom of information in printed 
media from various influential sources (e.g. legal, political and economic authorities). Although 
its qualitative score has been available since early 1980s, its quantitative score has not been 
available until 1994. Hence, in panel data analysis, press freedom score in 1994 will represent the 
freedom of the press in 1990 while the averaged value of this score between 1995-1998, 1999-
2002 and 2003-2006 represent freedom of the press in 1995, 2000 and 2005 respectively. Due to 
the unavailability in quantitative press freedom score in 1985, the panel data regressions will 
employ 4 time periods from 1990 to 2005. Furthermore, as the theoretical model in Section 3 
predicts that press freedom and education equality jointly affects corruption level, we will add the 
interaction terms between press freedom and different measures of education equality into 
regression specification. 
A measure of judicial independence from the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) is 
used to measures the magnitude of punishment (F) in the economy. This index complied by 
Henisz
30
. The independence of judiciary is identified by using the information from various 
measures of judicial independence including a polity score on executive constraint and a score on 
law and order in International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This measure is continuous from 0-1 
and available from mid19
th
 century until 2004. The higher value of this measure represents the 
strength and impartiality of legal system and the likelihood of judiciary to successfully constraint 
                                                 
29 This persistent originate from the nature of Barro and Lee education attainment data which is well known for its 
extreme persistent, thus some researchers change to enrollment data instead with the expense of measurement error, 
Glaeser et al. (2007) 
30 http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ContactInfo.html 
the decision of executive authority. As the degree of independency in court of justice increase, it 
is more likely that corrupt public officers will be fully accountable for their misuse of power. This 
likelihood of punishment can be seen as an increase in F in the theoretical model. 
Political pressure (γ) is measured by the degree of political competition and turnout data 
from Poliarchy measures of democracy from Vanhanen (2003). Data are available from 1810 to 
2002 in nearly all independent countries around the world. The measure of electoral competition 
represents the percentage of votes in parliamentary or presidential elections, or both, won by the 
largest party. Therefore, the smaller the measure is, the more likely a candidate from the small 
party won the election. Vanhanen argues that this occurrence represent the competitiveness of 
democracy. He also imposes the 70 percent upper limit on this measure to reduce the bias caused 
by the variation of electoral systems
31
. Another measure for political pressure is a turnout data 
which account for the percentage of the population which voted in the same elections that used to 
measure the electoral competition. These two measures will represent the political pressure (γ) in 
the regression analysis. 
 
4.4 Control Variables 
 
Many aspects of country characteristic have shown the deterministic relationship with 
corruption indices in the empirical literatures. However most of these factors fail to retain its 
robustness in the sensitivity analysis. Our list of controls for country’s characteristics will base 
primarily on the findings of global sensitivity analysis in Serra (2006). These controls include 
economic development, religion, political stability, origin of institutional and legal system and 
regional factors. 
To control for economic development and economic structure of a country, per-capita 
income at constant price and degree of openness are employed. These indicators are obtained 
from Penn World Table 6.2. For institutional and legal factors, following the argument in 
Treisman (2000) about the roles of legal culture and the stability of democracy, we, therefore, use 
the dummy variable for colonial history, equal to 1 if the country is a former UK colony, 0 
otherwise, and the dummy variable for uninterrupted democracy, equal to 1 if the country had 
remained democratic between 1950-1995, 0 otherwise. We also add the interaction term between 
an uninterrupted democracy and education equality into the regression specification to test 
whether education equality works differently between the countries with different establishment 
of democracy. In addition, religion factor has consistently found to be significant determinant of 
                                                 
31 Generally, proportional electoral systems tend to have a higher share of small parties than plurality or majority 
electoral systems 
corruption, La Prota et al (1999), Serra (2006) and Treisman (2000). To control for this factor, we 
use the population share with a protestant tradition from La Prota et al (1999) as a proxy for 
protestant in the regression analysis. Lastly, continental dummies are employed as the proxy for 
regional factors that could determine the perceived level of corruption. The dummies correspond 
to the division of regions in the World Bank’s classification which include Latin America, East 
European, Middle East, African, South Asia and Asia Pacific. Therefore, the baseline category is 
Western Europe and North America continents which contain the typical least corrupt countries. 
The descriptive statistics for the average values of other determinants of civic monitoring 
capacity and control variables between 1995-2005 are presented in Table 3 in Appendix 3. 
 
5   Regression Specifications 
 
 In Section 3, we illustrate that corruption is determined by education equality (σ), press 
freedom (I), political pressure (γ) and magnitude of punishment (F). Previous section describes 
how we transform those determinants of civic monitoring capacity into measurable indicators. 
Here we will specify the regression models to evaluate the anti-corruption effect of education 
equality. We construct 2 types of empirical models; the cross-national, pooled cross-national OLS 
regressions in averaged levels data and panel data fixed effect model. As our empirical agenda 
continues in the next Section, the appropriate empirical strategy is executed when the 
identification problem emerges. 
 
5.1 Cross-national OLS and Pooled Cross-sectional OLS 
 
Equation 5A formalises our theoretical predictions into a typical cross-national OLS 
regression in the determinant of corruption literature which is reviewed earlier. We regress 
corruption indices on the measures of education equality and the control variables described in 
the previous section. All variables are the averaged value from 1995 to 2005. In addition, as 
education equality shows its supporting anti-corruption role to other variables such as press 
freedom, we look for empirical evidence of this argument by including the interaction terms (κ) 
between education equality and other variables into the regression analysis. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the very first attempt in the determinant of corruption study that incorporates 
the interaction effects between education and press freedom into the analysis. When include the 
interaction term into the regression model, the interpretation of the results need some special 
treatments, which depend on the nature of the factors of κ
32
. The next section will discuss this 
issue in more detail. 
Also, one might concerns that what determine corruption is in fact the level of average 
years of schooling in total population or the proportion of population who graduate at a particular 
schooling level even though the theoretical model shows that it is indeed an equality effect. 
Furthermore, one can also think that education determine corruption though income effect. We, 
therefore, anticipate the arguments and test them by include those education variables (e) and per-
capita income as control variables in the regression analysis to check the robustness of education 
equality. Additionally, we also control for country’s characteristic and other determinants of 
corruption (x) that had its robustness verified by the sensitivity analysis in Serra (2006). 
Hence, the observed averaged level of corruption in country i between 1995-2005 is 
determined by the specification of the form; 
i i i i i i i i i i i icor e pf jur com tur xµ λ σ κ τ= + + + + + + + + + +  (5A) 
To estimate a more precise effect of education equality on corruption and incorporate 
within country variation across time dimension into the analysis, we extend our investigation to 
the repeated cross-country estimation. Similar to the equation 5A we estimate the pooled OLS 
regression model of cross-country data between 1990-2005 by regressing ICRG corruption index 
on the determinants of civic monitoring capacity, the interactions terms ( ijκ ), the control 
variables ( ijx ) and the time fixed effects, ijλ . Specifically, the observed level of corruption in 
country i at time j between 1990-2005 is determined by the specification of the form; 
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijcor e pf jur com tur xµ λ σ κ τ= + + + + + + + + + +  (5B) 
 
5.2   Fixed Effect Model 
 
 To anticipate the possibility of the omitting variable problem and the existence of 
unobservable heterogeneity, we employ a more advance methodology in the empirical 
investigation, the fixed effects estimation. Similar to Equation 5B, we regress ICRG index on the 
determinants of civic monitoring capacity (M), other education variables (e), the interaction term 
(κ), the control variables (x) and the time fixed effects, ijλ . Additionally, we control for individual 
                                                 
32 For example κ can be an interaction between categorical variable and continuous variable or both continuous 
variables. 
country specific characteristic, ijψ .
33
 Hence, the observed level of corruption in country i at time 
j is determined by the equation 5C; 
   
corij = α ij +ψ ij + λij + eij + M ij +κ ij + xij + ε ij   (5C) 
If education equality does indeed have the causal relationship with perceived level of 
corruption, the regression models presented here should be able to consistently identify the 
significant causal relationships. Moreover, the results should remain robust through various 
specification changes. These 3 specifications are the base models of our empirical investigation. 
However, if further identification problem emerges during the investigation we will present the 
new identification strategy to evaluate anti-corruption effect of education equality. The new 
results will then present subsequently. This will be the agenda for the next sections.  
 
6   Empirical Results 
 
Figure 1 in Appendix 1 gives the graphical description of the relationship between the 
dependent variable and its determinants. These evidences convey the necessary information to the 
readers before studying the subsequent regression results. However, this is not an attempt to 
suggest any causal relationship between variables. Subsequently, the baseline estimations from 
equations 5A and 5B, which are presented in Table 1-6 in Appendix 2, will be described before 
we discuss about identification problems and the strategy to overcome it in the next section. 
 Figures 1A to 1D present the scatter diagrams with the fitted regression lines between the 
averaged values of corruption indices and education equality measures between 1995-2005. In 
Figures 1A and 1B, all 3 corruption indices show a strong relationship with education equality 
measure. On average, the higher Median/Q4 ratio (σ), the lower corruption practices; while the 
higher Gini coefficient in education attainment (less equal distribution) the more likely corruption 
were observed in the society. Figure 1R re-presents Figure 1A again with clearer information 
about the specific country position in this analysis. Moreover, Figures 1L and 1M show the 
consistent association between ICRG corruption index and σ in Panel dataset between 1985-
2005. On the other hand, Figures 1C and 1D present graphic relationships between CPI 
corruption index and coefficient of variation in education attainment (CV) with two different 
intervals. From Figure 1C, it can be seen that there are some 5% of outliers in the CV data on the 
right of the majority of dataset. Figure 1D illustrates the same picture as Figure 1C but reduces 
                                                 
33 Most of empirical literatures of corruption employ fixed effect model rather than random effect model as it is 
generally believed that the country’s specific effect correlate to some extent with the covariates, after using Durbin-Wu 
test, the results support this argument well 
the scale of CV axis to 0-1 to focus primarily on the main samples. Apparently, the scatter 
diagrams with or without the outlier consistently show the negative relationship between 
perceived level of corruption and CV.  
 In addition, countries with higher income per capita and freedom of press seems to 
observe less corruption activities. Figures 1E and 1F show strong positive and negative trends 
between these factors and the CPI corruption index respectively. Furthermore, Figures 1G to 1K 
present scatter diagrams of CPI corruption index and 5 different education measures- average 
years of schooling in total population, percentage of population attained, primary, secondary and 
tertiary schoolings respectively. As one may expect, a country with higher years of average 
schooling and smaller proportion of population who have no schooling qualification tend to have 
less corruption in their society. Additionally, the more population attained primary, secondary or 
tertiary education the less likely corruption can be perceived in the society. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that among 3 schooling levels, the percentage of secondary schooling attainment 
shows the strongest link with corruption index whereas primary schooling attainment shows the 
weakest association.  
Therefore, the theoretical predictions in Section 3 that less equality in the distribution of 
education increases the likelihood of corruption practices are well supported from the graphical 
evidences in the scatter diagrams. Nevertheless, all hypothetical observations here need to be 
verified by the formal regression analysis in the next part; in which we will see whether these 
associations are causal or just spurious relationships. 
 
6.1   Cross-Country OLS 
 
It is crucial to note that all education measures in our analysis are lagged variables. In 
OLS regressions, education variables are the averaged values between 1960-1980 while all other 
variables are the averaged values between 1995-2005 whereas the Pooled OLS estimations in 
Section 6.2 employ the 10 years lagged values of education measures. This identification strategy 
is used to prevent the endogeneity problem between corruption and education equality and to 
minimise the undesirable transitory shocks that may affect corruption in each country. Moreover, 
using lagged values of educational measures reflects a more realistic story. People influence the 
level of corruption in the society for the most of their lives as the educated citizens can produce 
lasting anti-corruption or corruption initiatives. This argument is in line with Glaeser et al. (2007) 
and Svensson (2005)
34
. 
                                                 
34 They both find the empirical evidences support the economic and human capital theories of institutional development 
Table 1 and columns 1-6 in Table 2 present the baseline results of OLS regressions as 
specified by equation 5A without and with the vector of interaction terms (κ) respectively. 
Columns 7-12 in Table 2 present the results of Pooled OLS regressions with time fixed effects as 
specified by equation 5B. Table 2 presents the key estimations that use Median/Q4 as a measure 
of education equality, which has the theoretical support from Section 3, while Table 3 presents 
the robustness check by re-estimating equation 5A and 5B again with alternative measures of 
education equality. Additionally, Tables 4-6 include other aggregated measures of human capital 
to test the robustness of our main hypothesis as discussed previously.  
 
Education Equality and Press Freedom 
In Table 1, the estimates of the association between education equality and corruption 
indices as specified in equation 5A, without interaction term, yield no significant result. We thus 
follow the theoretical prediction by adding the interaction terms into the specification, the results 
are presented in Table 2. The result is unsurprising as the measures of education equality now 
show a significant relationship with the corruption indices. The possible explanation is that the 
equality in education distribution determines corruption level individually and jointly with other 
variables. When exclude the interaction terms from the regression specification the interaction 
effect remain inside the error term, which then creates the problem of omitted variable bias. As 
most of the significant interaction terms (columns 1,2,4,7-8,10-11 in Table 2) have opposite sign 
of the measures of education equality
35
, there are two opposite forces determining corruption 
level which need to be identified. Unable to identify such effect, the regression specifications in 
Table 1 fail to reject the null hypothesis that the measures of education equality have no causal 
relationship with corruption indices. 
From the results in regression 1, 2 and 4 in Table 2, given everything being equal, the 
countries with a smaller gap of schooling year between the median and the 4
th
 quartile in the 
distribution of education (higher Median/Q4) during 1960-80, the less likely the countries to be 
corrupt during the period 1995-2005. More specifically, from regression 1 in Table 2, reducing 
10% of the year of schooling gap between the median and the 4
th
 quartile (σ) increase 0.6112 
score of corruption indices. This increase is equivalent to the difference between CPI index of 
Cameroon (2.3) and Argentina (2.9) in 2005
36
. 
Nonetheless, as regression models in Table 2 contain 2 interactions of education equality 
measures with other determinants of corruption, the interpretation of anti-corruption effect of 
                                                 
35 See Figure L in Appendix A 
36 Figure S in Appendix 1 gives a supporting idea on how significant this difference is in reality. 
education equality measures need to incorporate the supplementary effect of other determinants if 
the interaction effects are significantly different from 0. Otherwise the interpretation can be 
inaccurate. In regressions 1 to 6, the coefficients of the interaction term between education 
equality and press freedom are significantly different from 0. Consequently, the interpretation of 
anti-corruption effect of education equality iσ  needs to incorporate the supplementary effect of 
press freedom. As both factors of interaction term are continuous, we need to calculate the net 
effect as follows: 
 Let iX represents other covariates, in Table 2 we regress; 
1 2 3 4( )i i i i i i i icor I I Xα β σ β β σ β ε= + + + ∗ + +     (6A) 
Calculate for the main effect 
       1 2 3( )i i i iIα β σ β β σ= + + + ∗   (6B) 
The anti-corruption effect of education equality ( iσ ) depends on the coefficients of 
education equality, press freedom (I), their interaction term and the level of press freedom. To 
make our interpretation more meaningful we choose the mean level of press freedom to interpret 
the result which equals to 42.5. Thus, using equation 6B, from regression 1 in Table 2 a reduction 
of 10% of the year of schooling gap yields, on average, an increase of the CPI index around 
0.717. This suggests that the OLS estimators in Table 1 underestimate the effect of education 
equality on corruption due to the omitted variable problem. Also, the earlier interpretation, which 
does not incorporate an interaction effects, undervalues the true effect of education equality. 
Table 6A and Figure 6A present graphically that the effects of Median/Q4 ( iσ ) on corruption 
depending on levels of press freedom. 
In Table 6A, the shaded area presents the negative effect of Median/Q4 on corruption 
which contradicts the intuition of our earlier findings. However, if one looks more closely, the 
negative effects of Median/Q4 level occurs when the level of press freedom increases to above 50 
(limited freedom). Therefore, the negative effect of the limitation in press freedom can overcome 
the positive effect of education equality on corruption score which leads to the negative net effect 
of education equality. This finding is consistent with the argument in Section 3 that although the 
equality in education distribution is very high, as long as freedom of information is limited, it is 
very difficult for the citizen to successfully challenge the corrupt officers. 
 
 
 
Table 6A The Effects of Median/Q4 and Press Freedom on CPI Index (with interactions) 
mdq 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
10 0.0166 0.06362 0.11064 0.15766 0.20468 0.2517 0.29872 0.34574 0.39276 0.43978 0.4868
20 0.0332 0.06612 0.09904 0.13196 0.16488 0.1978 0.23072 0.26364 0.29656 0.32948 0.3624
30 0.0498 0.06862 0.08744 0.10626 0.12508 0.1439 0.16272 0.18154 0.20036 0.21918 0.238
40 0.0664 0.07112 0.07584 0.08056 0.08528 0.09 0.09472 0.09944 0.10416 0.10888 0.1136
50 0.083 0.07362 0.06424 0.05486 0.04548 0.0361 0.02672 0.01734 0.00796 -0.00142 -0.0108
60 0.0996 0.07612 0.05264 0.02916 0.00568 -0.0178 -0.04128 -0.06476 -0.08824 -0.11172 -0.1352
70 0.1162 0.07862 0.04104 0.00346 -0.03412 -0.0717 -0.10928 -0.14686 -0.18444 -0.22202 -0.2596
80 0.1328 0.08112 0.02944 -0.02224 -0.07392 -0.1256 -0.17728 -0.22896 -0.28064 -0.33232 -0.384
90 0.1494 0.08362 0.01784 -0.04794 -0.11372 -0.1795 -0.24528 -0.31106 -0.37684 -0.44262 -0.5084
100 0.166 0.08612 0.00624 -0.07364 -0.15352 -0.2334 -0.31328 -0.39316 -0.47304 -0.55292 -0.6328  
 
To make this interpretation more intuitive, Figure 6A shows that given the press freedom 
level below 50 (free press), as we move down to 1 along the Median/Q4’s axis (more equality) or 
move up to 0 along the Press Freedom’s axis (more freedom), the CPI score increase. Put it 
differently, the marginal anti-corruption effect of education equality is positive. On the other 
hand, when the press freedom is above 50, the slopes become negative. This portrays that the 
marginal effect of an increase in education equality becomes negative when press freedom is 
limited. However, although the slopes become negative, the net effects still remain positive until 
the changes in Median/Q4 are more than 0.4. Hence, the negative net effects of Median/Q4 level 
occur when 2 conditions are met; when the level of press freedom is above 50 and an increase in 
education equality is dramatic (over 0.3). 
 
Figure 6A The Effects of Median/Q4 and Press Freedom on CPI Index (with interactions) 
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However, it is very difficult to see the net negative effect of education equality in reality. 
From the data of Median/Q4 between the period 1960-2000 which contains 832 observations, we 
calculate the first differences of this variable to see how likely any country in the dataset has had 
a change of over 0.3 units in Median/Q4 within its 5 years interval. We find that out of 738 
observations of the first differences, there are only 2 observations (0.28%) that had values above 
0.3. Hence, in principle the negative effect of education equality is possible but it is very unlikely 
to occur in reality. This likelihood is far less than the findings in Ahrend (2002). 
The other 2 measures of education distribution, the coefficient of variation and the Gini 
coefficient of education, which the results are presented in Table 3, show the similar relationships 
with corruption indices to the Median/Q4. The countries with less equal education distribution 
increase the likelihood of observing more corruption incidence, ceteris paribus. From regression 2 
in Table 3, the increase in 0.1 of the coefficient of variation in education attainment can explain 
the reduction in WB corruption index around -1.2. This is comparable to the average gap between 
WB corruption index from 1996-2005 between Brazil (4.8) and South Africa (5.9). Likewise, 
from regression 10 in Table 3, an increase of 0.1 in Gini coefficient in education attainment can 
explain the reduction of around 2.47 in the averaged CPI corruption index between 1995-2005. 
Nevertheless, using the same procedure as Table 6A above, we find that the net effect of 
education equality measured by Gini and coefficient of variation are always positive. In other 
words, given all possible levels of press freedom, the more equal the distribution of education 
measured by the Gini and CV, the less perceived corruption in the society. 
Similarly, press freedom has both individual and joint relationship with education 
equality measures, especially with the Gini and CV. Regressions in Table 3 consistently show 
that countries with more press freedom were less likely to witness corruption. However, the effect 
of press freedom was reduced by the inequality in education distribution. The interpretation of the 
press freedom effects from Table 3 is comparable to the interpretation of education equality 
above, this is presented by Figure 6C. Figure 6C depicts a negative relationship between press 
freedom and corruption from regression 10 in Table 3. Obviously, this link depends partially on 
the level of education equality measured by the Gini coefficient. The least corrupted society 
occurs at the top left of the plain where the distribution of education is at the most equal point and 
press freedom is at its freest point. On the contrary, the most corrupted society occurs at the 
bottom right of the plain with the most unequal distribution in education and fully limited 
freedom of the press. Hence, press freedom and education equality should be considered as 
complimentary tools in the anti-corruption campaign.  
 
Figure 6C Corruption by Press Freedom and Gini Education (with interaction) 
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Education Equality and Democracy 
In Table 2, the coefficient of the interaction term between Median/Q4 and uninterrupted 
democracy are insignificantly different from 0, hence the anti-corruption effect of education 
equality in a country that has more than 40 years of uninterrupted democracy (Alldem=1) is 
insignificantly different from a country that has not had such stability in its political system
37
. 
Therefore, we do not need to interpret anti-corruption effect of education equality in the country 
with and without uninterrupted democracy separately. Besides, the length of democracy shows no 
significant anti-corruption effect when Median/Q4 is used as the measure of education equality.  
Nevertheless, in Table 3, when Gini Coefficient and Coefficient of Variation are used as 
the measure of education equality, the effect of democratic stability becomes significantly 
positive. Base on the results in Table 3, the country with uninterrupted democracy is more likely 
receive, on average, 1-2 higher corruption score compare to the country with interruption. The 
possible explanation for this finding is that countries with established democracy may have 
institutional factors or supporting mechanisms which promote accountability more effectively 
than countries with fragile democracies. Moreover, some interaction terms between education 
equality measures and uninterrupted democracy are significantly different from 0 (columns 1-3, 
                                                 
37 Although we exclude this interaction out of the model, all main results are still robust 
6-9, 10 and 16-18) which means that the impact of changes in education distribution measuring 
by Gini coefficient and coefficient of variation in the country without 40 years of uninterrupted 
democracy (AllDem=0) is different from the country with 40 years of uninterrupted democracy. 
However, this finding is barely significant and highly sensitive to specification changes, thus we 
focus our attention primarily on the results from Table 2. 
 
Other Determinants of Civic Monitoring  
Regressions in Table 2 and 3 also show that most of the other determinants of civic 
monitoring capacity also have significant associations with corruption indices. Other things being 
equal, in countries with higher judicial independencies and competitive democracy corruption 
was less likely to occur. Moreover, countries with less Protestants, lower income per-capita and 
smaller degree of openness were more prone to corruption. However, the measure of legal and 
institutional culture, British heritage, does not show any significant link to perceived level of 
corruption across the globe. These findings are consistent with the Serra (2006). 
The results in regression 4-6 and 10-12 in Table 2 and regression 4-6, and 13-15 in Table 
3 include regional dummies into the regression model
38
. The Latin American countries tend to 
have more corruption than Western European and North American countries, specifically around 
1.5 points lower in corruption indices. Moreover, the anti-corruption effects of all education 
equality measures increase when adding the regional dummies. This suggests that the regional 
factors do matter in our analysis and can not be left in the residual terms. Nonetheless, all main 
results discussed above still remain robust. 
 
Other Educational Measures 
 So far the evidences in Table 2 support the theoretical predictions in Section 3 very well. 
Countries with more equal distribution of education tend to perceive less corruption. 
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, some people are still concerned that other aspects of education 
attainment determine corruption level. Table 4 and 6 test these alternative arguments by adding 
these additional educational measures (e) into the regression specification 5A. This attempt can 
also be seen as a robustness check of the results in Table 2. The main dependent variable in Table 
4 and 5 is the CPI corruption index while the main measures of education equality are Median/Q4 
and CV. 
 From regressions 1 in Table 4, adding average schooling years into the analysis reduce 
the effect of Median/Q4 on corruption by half of the results in Table 2, which makes it become 
                                                 
38 The results are available upon request 
insignificant whereas the average years of schooling itself is highly significant. An increase of 1 
year in average schooling in total population can increase around 0.3 units of CPI index (less 
corruption). On the other hand, the measures of average schooling years by education levels have 
differential effects on the corruption index. In regressions 2, the average years of primary 
schooling show no significant effect on the corruption index whereas the effects of education 
equality remain significant with slight reduction in its size. In contrast, regressions 3-4 show that 
the levels of average years of secondary and tertiary schoolings significantly determine the 
variation in the CPI index, so do education equality measures. An increase of 1 year in average 
years of secondary and tertiary schoolings raises corruption score around 0.6 and 2.6 respectively. 
 Although the measures of education equality lost its significance in determining 
corruption after adding the measure of average years of schooling, we argue that the reduction in 
the explanatory power of education equality is driven by the problem of muticolinearity. The 
correlation between Median/Q4 and average years of schooling in total population is over 0.9. 
Consequently, having both variables as the covariates is an inappropriate specification to study 
their causal relationship. Therefore, we propose an alternative approach to verify this argument. 
We calculate for Mean/Q4 by using the years of schooling attained by the citizen at the mean 
position in the distribution divided the year of schooling attained by the 4
th
 quartile. This new 
measure highly correlates with the measure of average year of schooling in total population (0.9). 
We regress the same regression model using all corruption indices as the dependent variables and 
compare the results with the model with Median/Q4. Table 5 presents these results. 
 Apparently, the effects of the new measure, Mean/Q4, on corruption are smaller than the 
effects of Median/Q4. Specifically, given constant year of schooling attained by the 4
th
 quartile of 
population, a 10% increase in the schooling gap between the median and the 4
th
 quartile raise the 
corruption indices around 0.29 scores
39
 higher than the exact increase in the gap between the 
mean and the 4
th
 quartile, see columns 1-6. In other words, moving the median close to the 4
th
 
quartile can reduce the likelihood of perceived level of corruption slightly more than moving the 
mean. Nevertheless, both Mean/Q4 and Median/Q4 do have the negative relationship with the 
levels of corruption in the society. 
 Another aspect of education attainment that may also determine the corruption level is 
the proportion of population that attained any particular schooling levels. As discussed earlier, 
Ahrend (2002) and Frechette (2006) find supporting results for this argument. However they both 
use the data on enrollment rate, not the attainment data that we are using. Table 6 revisits this 
argument by adding the proportions of the total adult population that attained 4 different 
                                                 
39 The net effects calculates by equation 6B 
schooling levels; no schooling, primary schooling, secondary schooling and tertiary schooling.  
The CPI index is used as the dependent variable in regressions 1-4 while Median/Q4 is used as 
the measures of education equality. 
Interestingly, having a more educated population does not necessarily always reduce the 
likelihood of corruption in the society. All measures of population share, in each schooling level, 
show significant and differential effects towards corruption. Specifically, from regressions 1-2, a 
1 percent increase in population share with no schooling or primary schooling result in the 
reduction of the CPI score (more corruption) by 0.02, though the effect of no schooling is 
insignificant. The effect of primary schooling is consistent with Ahrend (2002) and Frechette 
(2006). On the other hand, from regressions 3-4, a 1 percent increase in the population which has 
attained secondary or tertiary schooling increases around 0.05 and 0.09 score in the CPI (less 
corruption) respectively. Hence, having more population with an attainment in secondary 
education and above, brings about a less corrupted society. Put it differently, an increase in the 
proportion of population attaining schooling can reduce corruption in the society if only the 
schooling is the secondary level and above. 
This finding, however, contradicts that of Ahrend (2002:14) which show that only tertiary 
education can significantly control corruption while primary and secondary education have 
neither positive nor negative significant effects. These different findings could potentially 
originate from the difference in the measure in education between our work and Ahrend (2002) as 
discussed earlier. Moreover, in the sub-sample analysis Ahrend argues that the promoting-
corruption effect of secondary and tertiary education can occur when press freedom is extremely 
limited. Specifically, he classifies countries into 3 types; by the qualitative status of press freedom 
which is a very broad classification
40
. Potentially, when estimating the anti-corruption effect of 
education in each group separately, the intra-variations of press freedom inside each category of 
freedom status, which are left unidentified in the residual term, can cause a problem of omitted 
variable bias. As we find a very strong anti-corruption effect of secondary and tertiary education 
which remains robust through the specification changes while the effect of press freedom is 
barely significant, the negative finding in Ahrend’s sub-sample analysis is ambiguous. 
 
6.2  Pooled OLS Estimation 
 
Generally we re-estimate the OLS regression model as we did in the previous section; 
however, we employ the repeated cross-country dataset of the same set of countries between 
                                                 
40 Free, Partly Free and Not Free which each class accounts for around 30% difference in quantitative score 
1990-2005 and include time fixed effects into the model. Columns 7-12 in Table 2 and Columns 
7-9, 16-18 in Table 3 present the results of Pooled OLS regressions as specified by equation 6B. 
Table 4-6 add more measures of education to test the robustness of the main results as discussed 
previously. As CPI and WB corruption indices are only available from 1995, the regressions, 
which employ these indices as its dependent variable, will estimate the repeated cross-country 
dataset between 1995-2005. All education measures are in the 10 years lagged values. 
 
Education Equality and Press Freedom 
From regression 7 and 8 in Table 2, reducing 10% of the year of schooling gap between 
the median and the 4
th
 quartile increase around 0.851 and 0.837 scores of CPI and WB corruption 
indices respectively. When include the regional dummies into the regression model, the anti-
corruption effect of education equality in terms of corruption indices score is slightly reduce to 
0.724 and 0.673 respectively as presented in columns 10 and 11. Hence, the OLS regressions that 
employ averaged values and repeated cross-country datasets show highly consistent estimations 
of the anti-corruption effect of education equality measured by Median/Q4. The effects of Gini in 
education attainment and CV presented in columns 7-9 and 16-18 in Table 3 are also similar to 
the previous section. These evidences suggest that the country with a more equal education 
distribution is likely to have less corruption activity.  
Interestingly, the anti-corruption effects of education equality and economic development 
are insignificant in the regressions that employ ICRG corruption index as its dependent variable. 
The effects of other regressors also vary by its magnitude compare with the regressions that 
employ CPI and WB as its dependent variable. This difference could originate from the fact that 
ICRG is complied by a distinctive method compare to CPI and the WB as discussed earlier in 
Section 4. When different indices, which are designed to capture different aspects of corruption, 
are employed as dependent variable, it is possible that the estimations, even with the same 
specification, can yield slightly different results. Nevertheless, when dropping all the interaction 
terms from the specification, the effects of education equality and economic development become 
highly significant although the magnitude is reduce by half
41
. 
 
Other Determinants of Civic Monitoring 
Similar to earlier findings, richer countries seem to have less corruption specifically an 
increase in 1,000 US dollars of per-capita income can increase about 0.03-0.05 scores in 
corruption indices. In addition, the anti-corruption effect of press freedom, share of protestant and 
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 The results are available upon request 
uninterrupted democracy are very much the same as the cross-country OLS estimation in Section 
6.1. The effect of openness and political pressures are insignificant here. Interestingly, however, 
the income effect disappears when regional dummies are included to the regression specification 
while the effects of other explanatory variables remain unchanged. 
 
Other Education Measures 
The results from repeated cross-national estimations continue to reinforce the earlier 
findings in Section 6.1. Table 4-6 include additional measures of schooling to test the robustness 
of the main results as discussed previously. From regressions 5-16 in Table 4, Median/Q4 loses 
its explanatory power when including the measures of average years of schooling into the 
regression models. However, the anti-corruption effects of Median/Q4 when the average years of 
schooling in each education level are included remains consistent with the earlier findings in 
Section 6.1. Similarly, in regression 7-12 in Table 5, the gap between anti-corruption effects 
between Median/Q4 and Mean/Q4 is very much the same as columns 1-6. Additionally, from 
regressions 5-16 in Table 6, when include the percentage measures of total adult population that 
attained different education levels into the regression specification, the anti-corruption effect of 
Median/Q4 is significant and remain consistent with the results in Table 2. Additionally, the 
results confirm the differential anti-corruption effects of education in each schooling level as 
found in regression 1-4 from the same table. Specifically, an increase in the proportion of 
populations that attained secondary education or above, 10 years ago, significantly reduces the 
observed level of corruption measured by all corruption indices. On the other hand, increase in 
the percentages of total population with no schooling or with primary schooling attainment 
increase the observation of corruption in the society. Moreover, the effect of education equality 
remains robust except when the percentage of population attained secondary schooling is 
included. 
 
7 Identification Problems and Strategy 
 
Although the findings in Tables 1-6 highly support our hypothesis that education equality 
has independent and complimentary anti-corruption effect, this section checks for any possible 
misspecification problem which can lead to the loss of identifiability in the parameters of interest. 
We employ fixed effects model and instrumental variable to control the problems of endogeneity 
and omitting variable. The section starts by reviewing studies which portrays the endogenous 
relationship between education and corruption. 
 
7.1 Endogeneity Problem 
There are very well-documented literatures and policy recommendation from leading 
organisations that recognise the reverse causality between education and corruption. The 
literature consistently shows the effects of corruption on public provision of education
42
. 
Researches suggest that by reducing corruption today, it can improve the education system in the 
future by securing government funding to the targeted educational plans, Mauro (1998) and 
Reinikka and Svensson (2005). Using the instrumental variable (IV)
43
 estimation, Reinikka and 
Svensson show that an increase in public information exposure is associated with an increase in 
government spending to local schools which would have been extracted by rent-seeking 
activities. Additionally, the schools that are located nearer to the newspaper outlet which make 
them less prone to corruption are likely to have more students enrolled and bring about better 
student performances. 
The estimations presented in Section 6.1-6.2 anticipate the endogenous relationship 
between education and corruption presented by literature and identify the anti-corruption effects 
of education equality by using the lagged values of education measures to prevent such problem. 
The validity of this strategy depends upon the identifying assumption that the present value of 
corruption does not affect the past value of education measures. There are realistic arguments that 
support this assumption. Firstly, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that corruption 
today can cause education inequality in the past. Muaro (1998) and Rikka and Svensson (2005) 
present only the evidences in which current levels of corruption affect future values of education 
spending, enrollment rates and academic performance. Secondly, as subjective corruption indices 
were conducted primarily by evaluating the perception of international businessmen towards 
corruption in their host country, there is no clear channel that their perceptions
44
 toward the 
present level of corruption today can possibly determine the situation of education inequality a 
decade ago. 
We perform Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity to see how effective the current 
identification strategy is in preventing such problem. The results of the test on OLS and Pooled 
OLS estimations are presented in Table 7-8. Surprisingly, the coefficients of the residual terms 
from the reduced-from regression from regressions 4-6, 10-12 and 16-18 in Table 7 and from 
regressions 3-4 in Table 8 are consistently significant which means that the endogeneity problem 
still exists in the estimations. However, recall to the argument about heterogeneity discussed 
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43 They used the distance to the nearest newspaper outlet as an instrument of teacher’s knowledge on grant program 
44  There is no question about the country education system in the past 10-20 years in the questionnaire 
earlier, we suspect that the endogeneity problem detected by Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not 
originate from the reverse causality problem but from the unobservable heterogeneity problem. 
 
7.2 Unobservable Heterogeneity 
 
The problem of unobservable heterogeneity in our context is similar to the omission of 
the ability in earnings of return to schooling study. In our estimates, this problem could 
potentially originate from the correlation between educational regressors and unobservable anti-
corruption ability of civil society, more specifically; 
( )cor E X z vµ β θ α= + + + +  (7A) 
Equation 7A presents the hypothetical equality between corruption and its determinants 
where E and X stand for educational determinants and other determinants in Equation 5B while z 
represents the unobservable anti-corruption ability of civil society. When z is correlated with E, 
the residual term (αz+v) will be associated with the regressor E which cause the inconsistency in 
OLS estimators. In fact, from the surveys evidences in Table 6-7 in Appendix 3, it is difficult to 
reject the hypothesis that Cov[E, z] ≠ 0. 
There are some attempts that solve the unobservable heterogeneity problem in corruption 
study. In the attempts to evaluate the civic return to education in cross-country analysis by Ades 
and Di Tella (1999) and Ahrend (2002), they use the fixed effect panel data estimation to capture 
the unobservable country’s characteristic. Nevertheless, the validity of their attempt subjects to 
the identifying assumption that an unobserved heterogeneity effect is time-invariant. Frechette 
(2006) finds evidence that contradicts the time-invariant assumption, thus he employs the time-
varying instrumental variables in his fixed effects estimations. Hence we follow both 
recommendations from the literature and employ the method of instrumental variable and fixed 
effects estimation into our empirical investigation. If the unobservable anti-corruption ability is 
time-invariant, fixed effects estimation should provide the consistent parameters of our interest. 
However, if ability is indeed time varying factor, we also need to employ the instrumental 
variable method to identify the causal relationships in the fixed effects estimation. On the other 
hand, for averaged cross-national OLS estimates, IV method is the only option we have.  
 
7.3 Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
Fixed effects estimation is a demanding methodology, thus, due to the limited availability 
of our panel dataset, we start the fixed effects estimation from the simplest specification by 
running all corruption indices on education equality measures and income in regressions 1-9 in 
Table 9. The anti-corruption effect of education equality measures, Median/Q4 and Gini 
Coefficient, remain significant but its magnitude is substantially reduced compare to the earlier 
estimates. From regressions 2-3, reducing by 10% the year of schooling gap between the median 
and the 4
th
 quartile can increase by around 0.06-1.01 in score of corruption indices while a 10% 
reduction in Gini Coefficient increase around 2 scores in WB corruption indices. The reduction in 
anti-corruption effect of Median/Q4 supports the hypothesis that Cov[E, z] > 0. Thus, OLS 
estimator overestimates the anti-corruption effect of the education equality measure. Interestingly, 
the anti-corruption effect of Mean/Q4 is insignificant which suggests that the relative years of 
schooling attained by the median is more important than the mean citizen in anti-corruption 
context
45
. More importantly, in regression 11-12, when including the measure of average years of 
schooling into the model, the coefficient of Median/Q4 is relatively unchanged from regression 2-
3 while the effect of averaged schooling years is insignificant. This result suggests that the 
significance of this variable in Table 4 is driven by the correlation with unobservable anti-
corruption ability in the error term. 
 
7.4 Instrumental Variable and 2SLS Estimates 
 
To control the unobservable heterogeneity in averaged cross-national OLS estimates, the 
method of instrumental variable is most feasible one in our context. In Section 2, we have 
reviewed some efforts by Glaeser and Saks (2006), Cook (2002), Moretti (2004) and Park (2006) 
to ease the endogeneity problem by instrumenting education indicators. The IVs which have been 
used so far include population structure, gender ratio and share of church members in the 
community. Cook (2002) and Moretti (2004) use the demographic variables including the 
population structure, gender ratio and life expectancy at birth as the instruments whereas Park 
(2006) also employs world price of some commodities as an instrument. They argue that the 
variation in these variables influence human capital formation but not corruption and income. We 
follow the literature and propose the share of middle age cohort (15-60) in total population and 
gender ratio as the instruments
46
. The share of middle age cohort (m) is calculated by using the 
information of young (y) and aging (o) cohorts’ shares in total population, specifically; 
, 10 , 101it i t i tm y o− −= − −   (7B) 
From equation 7B, the share of the mid age cohort in country i at time t equals to 1 minus 
by the shares of young and old cohorts 10 years ago. Hence, when the shares of young and/or old 
                                                 
45 The result is available by request  
46 Data is obtainable at Population Division, United Nations; http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2 
cohorts increase, it raises the future share of mid age cohort. Gender ratio is also in 10 years-
lagged values, the value of 110 means that, on average, there are 110 men for every 100 women 
in total populations.  
To be valid instruments, these demographic variables need to be uncorrelated with the 
error terms in equations 5A and 5B, in particular the unobservable anti-corruption ability, and 
sufficiently correlate to the education equality measures. For the exogeneity criteria, the 
underlying argument is that larger share of mid age cohort means that old populations with lower 
averaged schooling years are leaving the population structure while the young generation with 
higher averaged schooling years enter. On the other hand, women have better opportunity to 
obtain schooling nowadays than decades ago. A new generation of female populations should 
attain higher schooling than her ancestors did. Therefore, the changes in these instruments are 
mainly due to the demographic variation which there is no obvious link to unobserved anti-
corruption ability. Therefore, it creates the exogenous variations for the distribution of human 
capital across population. For the second criteria, Figures 1N, 1O, 1P and 1Q in Appendix 1 show 
the graphical relationships between the endogenous variable, Median/Q4, and both instruments in 
2 datasets. Clearly, larger share of mid age cohort and female population correlate to the more 
equal distribution of education in the society.   
Nevertheless, the validity of this identification strategy still depends on the identifying 
assumption that these past demographic changes do not directly correlate with the current 
perceived level of corruption in the society. One concern may be that more mid age population 
bring about the intolerance against corruption and civic movements. However, based on the 
evidences presented in Magnus et al., 2002 and Glaeser et al., 2007, we argue that these anti-
corruption effect of demographic changes work through the education system. In other words, 
there are no clear direct link between demographic changes and the perceived level of corruption 
except through education channel. 
Hence, we run the first stage regression according to this specification; 
ij ij ij ij ij ija b cZσ µ λ ρ υ= + + + +   (7C) 
Let ijρ  stands for all predetermined variables while ijZ is vector of instrumental variables. 
Table 7-8 present the 2SLS results of averaged cross-national estimate and repeated cross-
national estimate accordingly. For robustness check, all 3 measures of education equality are 
instrumented and we estimate 2SLS regressions for all available corruption indices. From Table 
7, regressions 1-3 present the reduced forms estimates as specified by equation 7C by different 
measures of education equality. The results show that mid age cohort can significantly explain the 
variation of education equality measures while gender ratio can barely explain the variation. 
Columns 7-9, 13-15 and 19-21 present second stage estimations. When the measures of education 
equality are instrumented its anti-corruption effects become substantially larger. However, the F-
statistic for the test of overall fit of first stage regression at the bottom of Table 7 shows the 
values range from 1.3 to 5.5. As the anti-corruption effects of education equality measure become 
considerably larger than OLS estimates in Table 2-3 even the values of F-statistic in reduced form 
estimates are lower than 10, it is a rule of thumb that these are the signal of weak instrument 
problem. If the instrument is to be a legitimate instrument, it should correct inconsistency in the 
estimator of educational measure not increase. In this case, as Cov[E, z] > 0 the 2SLS estimator 
should be smaller than the OLS estimator which is contaminated by the effect from the error 
term. The possible explanation for the weak instrument problem is the limitation in the variation 
of instruments, especially the gender ratio
47
. 
The 2SLS estimates on repeated cross-section in Table 8 and fixed effects estimations 
with instrumental variable in Table 9 also present similar results and problem. From column 5-6, 
9-10 and 13-14 in Table 8, the anti-corruption effects of Median/Q4 and Gini Coefficient in 2SLS 
estimates are larger than OLS estimations in Table 2-3. However, this problem is improved in 
repeated cross-country context, as there are more observations available compare to the averaged 
OLS estimations. Consequently, the F-statistics increase around 5-6 times and the coefficients of 
the second-stage regression are sizable reduced. Therefore, for the cross-country analysis we need 
a better instrument or the larger panel data to estimate the consistent relationship between 
education equality and corruption. We leave this opportunity for future research. 
Nevertheless, we have estimated the fixed effects model that control unobservable 
heterogeneity problem by the country fixed effects. As long as the assumption that an unobserved 
anti-corruption ability is time invariant holds the identifiability of these results remains 
consistent. In fact, unlike the time varying unobserved heterogeneity in Frechette (2006) which 
determine the availability of rents in the economy, there is no clear evidence that the anti-
corruption ability of civil society around the globe has changed dramatically during the past 10 
years. Hence, the result of fixed effect model in Table 9 supports our hypothesis that education 
equality can control corruption while the results from OLS and Pooled OLS estimates in Table 2-
6 should be treated with caution until the legitimate instruments for education equality measures 
or the larger panel dataset is available. 
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7.5 Robustness Analysis 
 
We have implemented various approaches to check the robustness of our findings through 
the empirical investigation. These attempts include re-estimates the regression model with 
different dependent variables and different education equality measures and also add regional 
dummies and additional education variables. Moreover, we estimate our regression models in 4 
different specifications which include OLS, pooled OLS, 2SLS and Fixed effects model. The 
main findings remain robust throughout the changes. Nevertheless, we leave the intensive 
sensitivity analysis for future research. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
As different levels of education work differently in anti-corruption and corruption 
initiatives, policy makers should pay attention to the structural aspect of education distribution in 
the society.  Some studies find the evidence that support the hypothesis that education, in general, 
has insignificant or promoting effects on corruption. However they use a specific measure of 
education, mostly primary school enrollment, to support their argument. This paper argues that 
this is an inappropriate identification strategy. We have shown theoretical argument and empirical 
evidence which support an alternative hypothesis that the effect of education is differential in its 
levels of schooling and, more importantly, the equality aspect of education play a crucial role in 
determining the level of corruption in cross-country data. Therefore, the role of education in civic 
anti-corruption initiative should be treated differently by its levels and the nature of measurement. 
In addition, the freedom of information, which has received a growing attention in its crucial anti-
corruption role, works more effectively in the country with more equal distribution of education, 
and vice versa. Also, education equality has net anti-corruption effect at almost every quantitative 
levels of press freedom. Yet, it works better in a country with free press. This finding 
fundamentally contradicts to the previous literature which argues that education could only 
control corruption when the press freedom is high. Therefore, the consequence of human capital 
distribution should receive more attention from anti-corruption initiatives as a supplement tool to 
combat corruption. As education is like a two-sided sword in this context, understanding what 
each side is meant for should help policy makers and practitioners to employ education in an 
accurate and efficient way to control corruption in the society. 
 Moreover, a non-monotonic relationship between education and corruption emerges from 
the diverse roles of education. Hence, future research should study further in the theoretical path 
to gain a better understanding of this aspect in the relationship between education and corruption. 
Additionally, the potential effects of human capital distribution across other dimensions (e.g. 
genders and geographical areas) should also be examined. On the empirical stand point, the 
longer panel dataset and the micro-based dataset which have richness of both observations and 
time length should allow researchers to estimate a more precise effect of education on corruption 
with a more demanding identification strategy. 
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Appendix 1 
 Figure 1: Corruption and its determinants 
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Appendix 2: Regression Results 
 
Table 1: Determinant of Perceived Corruption* 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CPI CPI CPI WB WB WB ICRG ICRG ICRG
Median/Q4 1.837 1.142 -0.291
(1.348) (1.167) (1.108)
CV Education -0.0110 -0.0168 -0.0810**
(0.034) (0.025) (0.033)
Gini Education -0.347 -0.0490 0.0595
(1.080) (0.929) (0.885)
PGDP 0.0704*** 0.0721*** 0.0715*** 0.0552*** 0.0563*** 0.0568*** 0.0229 0.0208 0.0231
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Press Freedom -0.000702 -0.0102 -0.00878 -0.0150 -0.0210* -0.0215* -0.0265** -0.0262** -0.0271**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Elect Comp -0.0471*** -0.0475*** -0.0484*** -0.0460*** -0.0466*** -0.0482*** -0.0233* -0.0262** -0.0268**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Turnouts 0.0256** 0.0334*** 0.0320*** 0.0305*** 0.0351*** 0.0345*** 0.0299*** 0.0274*** 0.0277***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Judicial Independency 4.039*** 4.032*** 4.088*** 3.933*** 3.896*** 4.070*** 1.851** 1.608* 2.071**
(1.026) (0.982) (1.058) (0.924) (0.897) (0.948) (0.886) (0.922) (0.921)
Openness 0.0110** 0.0111** 0.0112** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0113*** 0.00585** 0.00528* 0.00602**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
AllDem 1.036** 1.146** 1.134** 1.112** 1.183*** 1.172*** 0.759* 0.772* 0.737*
(0.484) (0.513) (0.505) (0.425) (0.442) (0.440) (0.435) (0.423) (0.433)
British Colony -0.208 -0.196 -0.210 -0.204 -0.204 -0.229 -0.227 -0.283 -0.287
(0.306) (0.319) (0.321) (0.277) (0.282) (0.286) (0.293) (0.295) (0.302)
Share of Protestant 0.0203*** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.00854 0.00795 0.00767 0.0184*** 0.0182*** 0.0179**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 88 88 87 89 89 88 88 88 87
adj. R-sq 0.734 0.725 0.725 0.775 0.771 0.771 0.670 0.687 0.674  
Note: OLS coefficient with robust standard errors in parentheses. *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
*All variables are in averaged values between 1995-2005 
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Table 5 Determinant of Perceived Corruption with Median/Q4 and Mean/Q4* 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CPI WB ICRG CPI WB ICRG CPI CPI WB WB ICRG ICRG
Median/Q4 6.112** 5.114** 1.965 6.208*** 5.208*** 1.631
(2.440) (2.083) (2.417) (1.917) (1.206) (1.362)
Mean/Q4 4.608** 4.281** 2.614 5.162*** 4.307*** 1.750
(2.146) (1.757) (1.952) (1.906) (1.126) (1.256)
Median/Q4 x PF -0.141*** -0.127*** -0.0736 -0.0940*** -0.0737*** -0.0168
(0.052) (0.045) (0.058) (0.035) (0.022) (0.026)
Median/Q4 x AllDem 1.792 1.062 0.833 1.733 2.204 2.674**
(1.574) (1.336) (1.564) (1.529) (1.507) (1.205)
Mean/Q4 x AllDem 1.614 0.722 -0.537 -0.0830** -0.0641*** -0.0141
(1.609) (1.344) (1.763) (0.036) (0.020) (0.024)
Mean/Q4 x PF -0.116** -0.113** -0.0787 1.094 1.886 2.185*
(0.052) (0.045) (0.051) (1.377) (1.288) (1.193)
PGDP 0.0529*** 0.0399** 0.0135 0.0530** 0.0402** 0.0139 0.0504*** 0.0544*** 0.0446*** 0.0473*** 0.0304* 0.0316**
(0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Press Freedom 0.0166 0.000989 -0.0175 0.0109 -0.00160 -0.0139 0.0148 0.0122 0.00328 0.000794 -0.0103 -0.0106
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Openness 0.0109** 0.0111** 0.00581** 0.0107** 0.0110** 0.00609** 0.0134*** 0.0134*** 0.0105*** 0.0104*** 0.00422** 0.00392**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Elect Comp -0.0287** -0.0302** -0.0139 -0.0308** -0.0312** -0.0144 -0.0257*** -0.0257*** -0.0180*** -0.0182*** -0.00847 -0.00901
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Turnouts 0.0131 0.0195* 0.0234** 0.0179 0.0218** 0.0217* 0.0232*** 0.0253*** 0.0170** 0.0189** 0.0141 0.0137
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
AllDem 0.0657 0.452 0.294 0.0825 0.536 0.782 -0.0271 0.303 0.0211 0.202 -0.198 -0.00643
(0.560) (0.473) (0.535) (0.608) (0.502) (0.722) (0.643) (0.594) (0.677) (0.579) (0.511) (0.543)
British Colony -0.235 -0.236 -0.241 -0.122 -0.159 -0.247 0.216 0.288 0.0285 0.114 -0.136 -0.0530
(0.290) (0.262) (0.288) (0.292) (0.257) (0.290) (0.247) (0.252) (0.196) (0.199) (0.227) (0.234)
Share of Protestant 0.0114 0.00105 0.0138* 0.0112 0.00104 0.0146 0.0166*** 0.0185*** 0.00417 0.00527 0.0108** 0.0114**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Judicial Independency 3.830*** 3.786*** 1.751** 3.841*** 3.803*** 1.849** 1.238** 1.275** 1.487*** 1.505*** 1.400** 1.318**
(0.991) (0.878) (0.872) (0.989) (0.873) (0.893) (0.546) (0.547) (0.448) (0.451) (0.545) (0.537)
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 88 89 88 88 89 88 146 146 174 174 257 257
adj. R-sq 0.763 0.797 0.676 0.754 0.794 0.675 0.752 0.733 0.763 0.748 0.554 0.554  
Note: OLS coefficient with robust standard errors in parentheses. *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
*All variables in columns 1-6 are in averaged values between 1995-2005. Columns 7-12 present repeated cross-country estimations 
between 1990-2005 
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Table 8 Repeated Cross-National 2SLS 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Median/Q4 Gini Education CPI CPI CPI CPI WB WB WB WB ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG
Second Stage
Median/Q4 19.55*** 21.00*** 19.71*** 20.34*** 9.621*** 9.587***
(2.921) (4.172) (2.377) (3.840) (3.322) (3.500)
Gini Education -22.27*** -29.08*** -21.12*** -23.20*** -9.818*** -9.765**
(3.367) (7.779) (2.675) (5.789) (3.526) (3.813)
Median/Q4 x PF 0.0151*** -0.311*** -0.348*** -0.314*** -0.322*** -0.148*** -0.148**
(0.001) (0.053) (0.073) (0.041) (0.061) (0.056) (0.059)
Median/Q4 x AllDem 0.543*** -6.390*** -6.484** -6.609*** -7.006*** -2.301 -2.268
(0.063) (1.975) (2.829) (1.873) (2.677) (2.182) (2.370)
Gini x PF 0.0158*** 0.379*** 0.528*** 0.346*** 0.393*** 0.140** 0.139**
(0.001) (0.064) (0.144) (0.046) (0.100) (0.059) (0.065)
Gini x AllDem 0.546*** 4.695* 8.020* 4.945* 6.460* 0.441 0.385
(0.074) (2.706) (4.780) (2.621) (3.793) (2.396) (2.506)
PGDP 0.000495 -0.000945 0.0301** 0.0101 0.0495*** 0.0194 0.0260** 0.0115 0.0361** 0.0148 0.0204 0.0115 0.0205 0.0116
(0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Press Freedom -0.00431*** -0.00722*** 0.0732*** -0.189*** 0.106*** -0.226*** 0.0711*** -0.176*** 0.0864*** -0.182*** 0.0275 -0.0769*** 0.0276 -0.0762**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.018) (0.029) (0.032) (0.056) (0.013) (0.022) (0.027) (0.040) (0.017) (0.028) (0.019) (0.031)
Openness -0.000267*** 0.000246*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0151*** 0.0167*** 0.0127*** 0.0125*** 0.0118*** 0.0125*** 0.00571*** 0.00504*** 0.00563*** 0.00496**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Elect Comp -0.000469 0.000511 -0.0190*** -0.0184*** -0.0160 -0.0157 -0.00986* -0.00977* -0.00747 -0.00849 -0.00368 -0.00399 -0.00342 -0.00376
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Turnouts 0.00134*** -0.00130*** -0.00666 -0.0118 -0.00797 -0.0230 -0.0120 -0.0138* -0.0183 -0.0222 -0.00114 -0.00240 -0.00150 -0.00262
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
AllDem -0.211*** -0.188*** 2.958*** -1.198 3.262*** -1.853 3.254*** -1.048 3.655*** -1.170 1.663* 0.632 1.652* 0.653
(0.030) (0.026) (0.761) (0.958) (1.138) (1.650) (0.781) (0.869) (1.086) (1.313) (0.882) (0.884) (0.964) (0.931)
British Colony 0.0134 -0.0259*** 0.260 -0.101 0.0695 -0.597 -0.0134 -0.306* -0.137 -0.645* -0.189 -0.321 -0.189 -0.318
(0.009) (0.010) (0.230) (0.213) (0.342) (0.421) (0.181) (0.179) (0.292) (0.331) (0.228) (0.226) (0.254) (0.251)
Share of Protestant 0.000136 -0.000202 0.0159*** 0.0108** 0.0146** 0.00931 0.00351 0.0000234 0.00361 0.000216 0.0104** 0.00839* 0.0104** 0.00842*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Judicial Independency -0.00594 0.00565 1.189** 1.457*** 1.203 2.094** 1.314*** 1.389*** 1.704** 2.276*** 1.250** 1.135** 1.263** 1.145*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.530) (0.503) (0.764) (0.888) (0.419) (0.427) (0.661) (0.691) (0.559) (0.542) (0.610) (0.605)
Fisrt Stage
%Mid Cohort 0.00815*** -0.00693***
(0.001) (0.001)
Gender Ratio -0.00231*** 0.00253***
(0.001) (0.001)
Hausman Test
Median/Q4_res -17.68*** -18.53*** -10.04***
(2.972) (2.840) (3.790)
Gini Education_res 21.29*** 20.90*** 10.09**
(3.109) (3.008) (3.912)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 23.37 9.99 22.47 12.66 31.62 21.00
N 257 257 144 144 144 144 172 172 172 172 254 254 254 254
adj. R-sq 0.931 0.920 0.792 0.804 0.607 0.426 0.812 0.812 0.568 0.477 0.568 0.575 0.496 0.499  
Note: OLS coefficient with robust standard errors in parentheses. *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
 
T
ab
le
 9
 F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 E
st
im
at
io
n
s 
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
F
E
-I
V
F
E
-I
V
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
C
P
I
W
B
IC
R
G
C
P
I
W
B
IC
R
G
C
P
I
W
B
IC
R
G
C
P
I
W
B
IC
R
G
IC
R
G
IC
R
G
S
e
c
o
n
d
 S
ta
g
e
M
e
d
ia
n
/Q
4
0
.4
7
4
1
.0
1
9
*
0
.6
6
1
*
1
.2
8
2
0
.9
9
8
*
0
.6
7
1
*
3
.5
7
5
**
5
.1
1
5
*
(0
.7
8
7
)
(0
.5
5
5
)
(0
.3
7
3
)
(0
.8
6
2
)
(0
.5
8
2
)
(0
.3
8
4
)
(1
.7
9
2
)
(2
.7
3
6
)
C
V
 E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
0
.1
9
8
0
.0
5
4
3
-0
.0
1
6
1
(0
.2
7
1
)
(0
.1
4
3
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
G
in
i 
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
0
.0
0
0
4
2
9
-1
.9
9
2
*
-1
.0
2
1
(1
.4
4
3
)
(1
.0
7
7
)
(1
.2
6
3
)
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 S
c
h
o
o
lin
g
 Y
e
a
rs
-0
.1
6
9
0
.0
0
1
2
8
0
.0
1
4
9
0
.3
7
3
(0
.1
6
1
)
(0
.1
1
7
)
(0
.1
3
8
)
(0
.2
7
3
)
P
G
D
P
0
.0
0
8
1
7
-0
.0
0
0
0
4
4
7
-0
.0
2
5
8
**
0
.0
0
6
7
2
-0
.0
0
1
8
9
-0
.0
2
5
0
**
0
.0
0
7
5
9
0
.0
0
2
4
8
-0
.0
1
8
9
0
.0
0
4
2
4
-0
.0
0
5
1
7
-0
.0
2
5
7
**
-0
.0
3
3
9
**
-0
.0
3
4
4
**
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
F
is
rt
 S
ta
g
e
-0
.0
2
2
**
*
-0
.0
1
7
**
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
%
M
id
 C
o
h
o
rt
 (
1
s
t 
S
ta
g
e
)
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
G
e
n
d
e
r 
R
a
ti
o
 (
1
s
t 
S
ta
g
e
)
Y
e
a
r 
F
ix
e
d
 E
ff
e
c
ts
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 F
ix
e
d
 E
ff
e
c
ts
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
2
4
4
2
7
9
3
6
6
2
4
4
2
7
9
3
6
6
2
4
0
2
7
3
4
5
0
1
8
2
2
1
3
3
6
6
3
6
3
3
6
3
W
it
h
in
 R
-s
q
0
.0
1
3
2
0
.0
6
7
8
0
.1
6
4
0
.0
1
4
3
0
.0
5
1
2
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
1
0
9
0
.0
7
7
1
0
.1
7
8
0
.0
4
6
3
0
.1
2
8
0
.1
6
4
O
v
e
ra
ll 
R
-s
q
0
.5
7
3
0
.4
8
7
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.1
0
3
0
.0
1
0
.3
4
3
0
.4
7
1
0
.0
6
4
0
.1
3
2
0
.3
5
9
0
.0
1
2
0
.1
2
4
0
.3
8
9
 
 N
o
te
: 
O
L
S
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
w
it
h
 r
o
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
*
P
<
0
.1
0
, 
*
*
P
<
0
.0
5
, 
*
*
*
P
<
0
.0
1
Appendix 3 
 
Table 1 Correlation Matrix of Corruption Indices (average levels between 1995-2005) 
 ICRG CPI WB 
ICRG 1   
CPI 0.8152 1  
WB 0.8376 0.9813 1 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Corruption Indices 
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
CPI
1998 5.23 4.65 1.40 10.00 2.48
2000 5.46 5.00 1.70 10.00 2.42
2002 5.36 4.48 1.70 10.00 2.34
2004 5.36 4.47 1.80 10.02 2.31
2006 4.60 3.30 1.80 9.60 2.45
WB
1998 5.50 4.53 1.70 10.04 2.39
2000 5.43 4.55 1.88 9.98 2.30
2002 5.36 4.48 1.70 10.00 2.34
2004 5.36 4.47 1.80 10.02 2.31
2005 5.31 4.45 2.10 9.98 2.28
ICRG
1985 5.59 5.00 0.00 10.07 2.62
1990 5.68 5.00 0.00 10.00 2.50
1995 6.07 5.49 0.00 10.00 2.29
2000 5.64 5.42 1.08 10.00 2.09
2005 4.78 4.50 0.52 10.00 1.99  
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Civic Monitoring Capacity and Control Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Note
Per-Capita Income 8.979 8.967 0.248 30.975
Press Freedom 42.579 23.382 7.813 95.625 0=free
Degree Openness 73.994 51.610 16.823 340.126
Electoral Competition 38.088 21.185 0 70 0=Most Competition
Turnouts 34.416 18.216 0 67.14 %
Judicial Independency 0.463 0.278 0 0.892 1=Most Independent
Share of Protestant 14.282 23.163 0 97.8
Past British Colony 0.376 0.487 0 1 1=Yes
Uninterrupted Democracy 0.247 0.434 0 1 1=40 years Dem
Latin American 0.223 0.419 0 1 1=Yes
East European 0.043 0.203 0 1 1=Yes
Middle East 0.106 0.310 0 1 1=Yes
African 0.223 0.419 0 1 1=Yes
South Asia 0.043 0.203 0 1 1=Yes
Asian Pacific 0.128 0.335 0 1 1=Yes  
Table 4: A Survey of Corruption Determinants
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Variables (+) Positive-Significant by (+) (-) Negative-Significant by (-)
Income #* Braun-Di Tella (2004), Frechette (2001)
Alt-Lassen (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Paldam (2002-01), 
Frechette (2001), Treisman (2000), Wei (2000), Ades-Di 
Tellla (1999), van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997)
Income Distribution* Paldam (2002)
Government Expenditure Ali-Isse (2003) Fisman-Gatti (2002), Bonaglia et al. (2001)
Government Revenue Lederman et al. (2005), Alt-Lassen (2003)
Govt. transfter to lower level Lederman et al. (2005)
Black market premium Brunetti-Weder (2003), van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997)
Inflation, Inflation Vars. Braun-Di Tella (2004), Paldam (2002-01)
Foreign Aid Ali-Isse (2003) Tavares (2003)
Import share
Herzfeld-Weiss (2003), Fisman-Gatti (2002), Frechette 
(2001), Treisman (2000), Ades-Di Tella (1999)
Raw material export
Herzfeld-Weiss (2003), Tavares (2003), Bonaglia et al. 
(2001), Frechette (2001) Frechette (2001)
Trade openness #*
Brunetti-Weder (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Fisman-Gatti 
(2002), Frechette (2001), Wei (2000), Ades-Di Tella (1999), 
Leite-Weidmann (1997)
Economic Freedom Graeff-Mehlkop (2003), Paldam (2001)
Gurgur-Shah (2005), Ali-Isse (2003), Graeff-Mehlkop (2003), 
Park (2003), Treisman (2000), Goldsmith (1999)
Entry barriers Broadman-Recanatini (2002-00) Gurgur-Shah (2005), Suphachalasai (2005)
Structural reform Abed-Davoodi (2000)
Infrastructure Broadman-Recanatini (2000)
Budget constraint Broadman-Recanatini (2002-00)
Democracy, civil liberty*
Paldam (2002), Bonaglia et al. (2001), Frechette (2001), 
Swamy et al. (2001), Treisman (2000), Wei (2000), Ades-Di 
Tella (1999-97), Leite-Weidmann (1997), Goldsmith (1999), 
van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997)
Press freedom, media*
Lederman et al. (2005), Suphachalasai (2005), Brunetti-
Weder (2003)
Turnout* Chowdhury (2004)
Electoral Compeition* Chowdhury (2004)
Decentralization, Federalism
Brown et al. (2005), Kunicova-R. Ackerman (2005), 
Damania et al. (2004), treisman (2000), Goldsmith 
(1999)
Gurgur-Shah (2005), Lederman et al. (2005), Fisman-Gatti 
(2002), Ali-Isse (2003), Wei (2000)
District maginute Chang-Golden (2004)
Closed list system
Kunicova-R. Ackerman (2005), Persson-Tabellini 
(2003), Persson et al. (2003) Lederman et al. (2005), Chang-Goldern (2004)
Presidentialism
Brown et al. (2005), Kunicova-R. Ackerman (2005), 
Lederman et al. (2005), Chang-Golden (2004)
Number of party Chang-Golden (2004)
Political instability Park (2003), Leite-Weidmann (1999)
Uninterupted Democracy #* Treisman (2000)
Ideological Polarization Brown et al. (2005)
Majoritarian plurality Kunicova-R. Ackerman (2005)
Central Planning Abeb-Davoodi (2000)
Women in public position Swamy et al. (2001)
Variables (+) Positive-Significant by (+) (-) Negative-Significant by (-)
Schooling* Ahrend(2002), Frechette (2006)
Ali-Isse (2003), Alt-Lassen (2003), Brunetti-Weder (2003), 
Persson et al. (2003), Evan-Rauch (2000), Ades-Di Tella 
(1999-97), van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997), Ahrend (2002), 
Glaeser and Saks (2006)
Population
Damania et al. (2004), Alt-Lassen (2003), Knack-Azfar 
(2003), Fisman-Gatti (2002) Tavares (2003)
Femal labour force Swamy et al. (2001)
Government wage
Alt-Laseen (2003), Herzfeld-Weiss (2003), Rauch-Evan 
(2000), van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997)
Quality of bureaucracy
Gurgur-Shah (2005), Brunetti-Weder (2003), van Rijckeghem-
Weder (1997)
Merit system Rauch-Evan (2000)
Judicial Independency* Rios-Figueroa (2006) Waisman (2005), Rios-Figueroa (2006)
Rule of law
Ali-Isse (2003), Brunetti-Weder (2003), Herzfeld-Weiss 
(2003), Park (2003), Broadman-Recanatini (2000), Leite-
Weidmann (1997), Ades-Di Tella (1997)
Population with particular 
religious affiliation #* Paldm (2001), La Porta et al (1999)
Chang-Golden (2004), Herzfeld-Weiss (2003), Persson et al. 
(2003), Bonaglia et al. (2001), Paldam (2001), Treisman 
(2000), La Porta et al. (1999)
Ethnic heterogeneity*
Lederman et al (2005), Suphachalasai (2005), Herzfeld-
Weiss (2003), Treisman (2000), La Porta et al (1999) Bonaglia et al. (2001)
Colonial past #* Gurgur-Shah (2005), Tavares (2003)
Herzfeld-Weiss (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Swamy et al. 
(2001), Treisman (2000)
Distance to large exporter Ades-Di Tella (1999) Bonaglia et al. (2001)
Legal origin Gatti (1999), La Porta et al (1999) Suphachalasai (2005)
Area wide Bonaglia et al. (2001)
Latitude La Porta et al. (1999)
Mascullinity Park (2003)
Natural Resources Leite-Weidmann (1997)
Judicial and Bureaucratic Factors
Culture and Geographical Factors
Economic Factors
Economic Institution Factors
Demographic Factors
Political Factors
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